Новости компаний. Полузащитник Н’Голо Канте после подписания контракта с саудовским клубом «Аль-Иттихад» приобрел профессиональный футбольный клуб в Бельгии. Об этом сообщает журналист Саша. Иммануи́л Кант — немецкий философ, один из центральных мыслителей эпохи Просвещения. Всесторонние и систематические работы Канта в области эпистемологии, метафизики.
Собрались с мыслями. 300 лет Иммануилу Канту. В чем причины русского "антикантианства"? 25.04.2024
И что такое человек? Что он должен делать? Способен ли он надеяться? В третьем ответе кантовского чат-бота надежду чат-бот высказал относительно того, что будет развиваться, но уровня человеческого мышления не достигнет, но, на мой взгляд, это сомнительно.
Мне кажется, что это вполне реально, и я, с одной стороны, боюсь, с другой — надеюсь застать это на своём веку.
Kant for us is a Russian trophy. Like everything you see in the Kaliningrad region - said Alikhanov. He added that any prudent owner must deal with the inheritance received, and said that Russian thought often opposed Kant. Moreover, the Russian Federation now has plenty of German trophies.
Надели другой - мы уже в двадцатом столетии, слышим Маяковского, который прилетал в Кенигсберг и из Девау ехал на машине в Берлин. Мне кажется, это очень интересно.
Канта Валентин Балановский. Кое-что может найти и человек, который хорошо разбирается в предмете. Книга вышла тиражом в пять тысяч экземпляров и доступна в магазине Кафедрального собора. Получить издание с автографом смогли все, кто пришел на встречу с автором 21 и 23 апреля. Но эта лекция - также доказательство безбрежности мира Канта.
Jimmy thinks its funny. Of course, any drama that Gibson directs pales in comparison to his own behind-the-scenes odyssey: the story of an odious individual who, after years on the outskirts of Hollywood, has somehow managed to fight his way back into the mainstream. Have some damn respect for those who did risked their lives incredible things so hacks like you can write garbage like that and be paid for it, you stupid, stupid fool.
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Канте прошёл вторую часть медобследования перед переходом в «Аль-Иттихад»
Because, at the time, this enclave was not Russian, but constituted the eastern slope of Prussia, a region fortified by the Teutonic knights from the 13th century. As "one of the founding fathers of the modern West" , Immanuel Kant "laid the foundations of classical German philosophy" , cutting it off from , he explains quite generally, without say more about these values.
В молодости он изучал Ньютона и Лейбница. Так что он был знаком со всеми физическими понятиями, — рассказал доктор Штайн. Поэтому философия не должна быть чем-то вроде витания в воздухе без связи с реальным миром. А физика не должна просто что-то делать, не думая об этом.
И Кант объединяет нас всех — и физиков, и философов».
Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition. Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did.
Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations.
All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal.
At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves.
The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects.
That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves.
A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading.
The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking.
Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version.
On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way. In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive.
We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience.
The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way. Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door.
Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations.
That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind. The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective.
These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world. Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysical deduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction. But since categories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules for making judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives at his table of categories by considering how each logical function would structure judgments about objects within our spatio-temporal forms of intuition. For example, he claims that categorical judgments express a logical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to the ontological relation between substance and accident; and the logical form of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that corresponds to cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, the transcendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious by representing an objective world of substances that interact according to causal laws. To see why this further condition is required, consider that so far we have seen why Kant holds that we must represent an objective world in order to be self-conscious, but we could represent an objective world even if it were not possible to relate all of our representations to this objective world.
For all that has been said so far, we might still have unruly representations that we cannot relate in any way to the objective framework of our experience. So I must be able to relate any given representation to an objective world in order for it to count as mine. On the other hand, self-consciousness would also be impossible if I represented multiple objective worlds, even if I could relate all of my representations to some objective world or other. In that case, I could not become conscious of an identical self that has, say, representation 1 in space-time A and representation 2 in space-time B. It may be possible to imagine disjointed spaces and times, but it is not possible to represent them as objectively real. So self-consciousness requires that I can relate all of my representations to a single objective world.
The reason why I must represent this one objective world by means of a unified and unbounded space-time is that, as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time are the pure forms of human intuition.
It is strange that Mr. Scholz has not yet prohibited the Russian military from dismantling it. Our news channels Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.
Emmanuel Kant
These questions raise important economic and educational issues on which philosophy sometimes throws precious light. We will see it from an example of the thought of Emmanuel Kant 1724-1804 on education. Let us begin by recalling some of these digital issues that current events force us to consider. There is of course first of all this crucial question of distance schooling, which the crisis we are going through has forced us to practice. What lessons can be learned from it? Steve Bissonnette and Christian Boyer reviewed research from eight countries on these questions.
The decline in learning seems to be demonstrated for all clienteles, and even more strongly for children in primary schools from less fortunate families, less educated and for those who have learning difficulties or who are fragile in their learning. This conclusion is consistent with what we observed about the virtual school before the pandemic and strongly suggests that, if there is no choice, as was the case with the pandemic, it can be. But if we have the choice … Can one-off innovations be desirable and welcome? Without a doubt.
Kant for us is a Russian trophy.
Like everything you see in the Kaliningrad region - said Alikhanov. He added that any prudent owner must deal with the inheritance received, and said that Russian thought often opposed Kant. Moreover, the Russian Federation now has plenty of German trophies.
В ходе мероприятия участники рассмотрели широкий спектр проблем теории и практики современных международных отношений и безопасности через призму политической и международно-правовой мысли выдающегося философа. В центре внимания не только наиболее острые проблемы развития современного политического миропорядка, глобальной и региональной безопасности, но и обстановка в Балтийско-Арктическом регионе, а также вопросы мирового социально-экономического и политического развития. В специальной сессии приняли участие ведущие специалисты в области международной политики из России, Финляндии, Германии, Индии и Республики Беларусь.
Идея учреждения данной площадки была впервые высказана академиком А.
Moreover, the Russian Federation now has plenty of German trophies. Recently, a slightly damaged Leopard 2A5 tank was removed from the battlefield. It is strange that Mr. Scholz has not yet prohibited the Russian military from dismantling it.
Собрались с мыслями. 300 лет Иммануилу Канту. В чем причины русского "антикантианства"? 25.04.2024
The Life, Work and Legacy of Carl Jung. Category: Emmanuel Kant. Kant jettisoned traditional theistic proofs for God as utilized by natural theology, but sought to ground ethics, in part, in his concepts of categorical imperatives or universal maxims to guide morality. Иммануил Кант-немецкий философ, родоначальник немецкой классической философии, стоящий на грани эпох Просвещения и Романтизма. President Emmanuel Macron, during a speech on Europe, in the amphitheater of the Sorbonne University, Paris, April 25, 2024. Emmanuel Kant is Lupa's first experience with Polski Theatre in Wroclaw, though the leading part is played by the protagonist of his first productions in Jelenia Gora, Wojciech Ziemianski.
Кант Иммануил
The Inaugural Dissertation also tries to reconcile Newtonian science with traditional morality and religion in a way, but its strategy is different from that of the Critique. According to the Inaugural Dissertation, Newtonian science is true of the sensible world, to which sensibility gives us access; and the understanding grasps principles of divine and moral perfection in a distinct intelligible world, which are paradigms for measuring everything in the sensible world. So on this view our knowledge of the intelligible world is a priori because it does not depend on sensibility, and this a priori knowledge furnishes principles for judging the sensible world because in some way the sensible world itself conforms to or imitates the intelligible world. Soon after writing the Inaugural Dissertation, however, Kant expressed doubts about this view. As he explained in a February 21, 1772 letter to his friend and former student, Marcus Herz: In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the soul brought about by the object.
However, I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible…. And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects — objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby? The position of the Inaugural Dissertation is that the intelligible world is independent of the human understanding and of the sensible world, both of which in different ways conform to the intelligible world. But, leaving aside questions about what it means for the sensible world to conform to an intelligible world, how is it possible for the human understanding to conform to or grasp an intelligible world?
If the intelligible world is independent of our understanding, then it seems that we could grasp it only if we are passively affected by it in some way. So the only way we could grasp an intelligible world that is independent of us is through sensibility, which means that our knowledge of it could not be a priori. The pure understanding alone could at best enable us to form representations of an intelligible world. Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind.
In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world. But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties.
We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us.
This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object as an object of the senses conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized as given objects conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree.
Bxvi—xviii As this passage suggests, what Kant has changed in the Critique is primarily his view about the role and powers of the understanding, since he already held in the Inaugural Dissertation that sensibility contributes the forms of space and time — which he calls pure or a priori intuitions 2:397 — to our cognition of the sensible world. But the Critique claims that pure understanding too, rather than giving us insight into an intelligible world, is limited to providing forms — which he calls pure or a priori concepts — that structure our cognition of the sensible world. So now both sensibility and understanding work together to construct cognition of the sensible world, which therefore conforms to the a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties: the a priori intuitions of sensibility and the a priori concepts of the understanding. This account is analogous to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus in astronomy because both require contributions from the observer to be factored into explanations of phenomena, although neither reduces phenomena to the contributions of observers alone.
For Kant, analogously, the phenomena of human experience depend on both the sensory data that we receive passively through sensibility and the way our mind actively processes this data according to its own a priori rules. These rules supply the general framework in which the sensible world and all the objects or phenomena in it appear to us. So the sensible world and its phenomena are not entirely independent of the human mind, which contributes its basic structure. First, it gives Kant a new and ingenious way of placing modern science on an a priori foundation.
In other words, the sensible world necessarily conforms to certain fundamental laws — such as that every event has a cause — because the human mind constructs it according to those laws. Moreover, we can identify those laws by reflecting on the conditions of possible experience, which reveals that it would be impossible for us to experience a world in which, for example, any given event fails to have a cause. From this Kant concludes that metaphysics is indeed possible in the sense that we can have a priori knowledge that the entire sensible world — not just our actual experience, but any possible human experience — necessarily conforms to certain laws. Kant calls this immanent metaphysics or the metaphysics of experience, because it deals with the essential principles that are immanent to human experience.
In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located.
We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism.
What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter.
We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition.
Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves.
Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations.
This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind.
Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves.
Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience.
But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility.
If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves.
So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves.
But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general.
So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy.
Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories.
В какой-то момент дом Канта официально был признан бедным отец старел, мать умерла, еще пожар был, был и новый дом. Зачислили в реестр бедных ремесленников, помогали дровами, снизили налоговую ставку.
Потом мальчик получил шанс поступить в престижную гимназию. Он ненавидел ее, но изучил латынь, немного французского, основы английского языка. Одна из причин ненависти была такая: ученики этой гимназии должны были ежедневно вести дневник. В дневнике надо было вести «учет души». И фиксировать.
Для Канта эта постоянная слежка за собой была неприемлема. Его университеты Университет был один — в Кенигсберге. Там была свобода, которой он не очень пользовался. Он просто ее ощущал. Никаких пирушек и резвой жизни.
Только учеба. Потом умирает отец, денег как не было, так и нет. Начинаются частные уроки, и ради этого он выезжает из Кенигсберга. Позже покидать родной город он пытаться не будет. Будет бороться за место профессора, и вся история с войной Пруссии и России особенно его не затронет.
Он даже письмо Екатерине Второй напишет, с просьбой о месте в университете. Не заразитесь женской логикой Он дважды собирался жениться и не собрался. У него изначально было слабое здоровье, но он прожил почти 80 лет. Он был на званых вечерах, даже блистал, хотя все считали его не очень красивым. Впрочем, и званые вечера были весьма провинциальны, а одна из дам, почтившая своим вниманием Канта, писала ему письма с орфографическими ошибками.
У нее ничего особенного не вышло, и Кант прослыл женоненавистником. Что подтверждал и в высказываниях, называя брак рабством. Женщин же он считал существами, не способными логически мыслить.
В критическом периоде философ возносит метафизику к наукам, создает новое учение, основанное на активности сознания. Свое первое сочинение под названием «Мысли об истинной оценке живых сил» Кант написал еще в годы учебы в университете. Большое влияние на него оказал преподаватель Кнутцен. Работа попала в печать только в 1749-м, благодаря стараниям и материальной поддержке дядюшки Рихтера. Иммануил не получил университетский диплом. В 1746 году умер отец, забота о материальном благополучии семьи легла на его плечи.
Кант находит работу домашнего учителя и на протяжении долгих десяти лет учит детишек из богатых семей. Все свободное время молодой человек посвящал написанию философских трудов, которые впоследствии стали основой его учения. В 1755-м философ возвращается в родной вуз. Его цель — защита диссертации «Об огне» и получение степени магистра. Осенью того же года он представил свою новую работу «Новое освещение первых принципов метафизического познания» и стал доктором наук. Теперь он имеет право преподавать в университете и незамедлительно воспользовался этой возможностью. Он учил студентов логике и метафизике. Самой интересной работой первого периода философской деятельности Канта ученые назвали «Всеобщую естественную историю и теорию неба». В ней изложена история происхождения Вселенной, причем с точки зрения физики, а не теологии.
В том же периоде Кант занялся изучением теории пространства с точки зрения физики. Он верил в то, что Высший Разум существует, и именно он положил начало жизни на Земле. Иммануил говорил, что существование материи доказывает существование Бога. Он считал, что за материальными вещами обязательно стоит их Создатель. Именно эта мысль отражена в его труде под названием «Единственно возможное основание для доказательства бытия Бога». Начало критического периода философского творчества Канта пришлось на годы преподавания логики и метафизики в вузе. Гипотезы ученого менялись постепенно. Вначале он пересмотрел свое отношение к пространству и времени. Этот период биографы Канта назвали критицизмом.
В эти годы он пристально изучал этику, эстетику, гносеологию, написал самые выдающиеся свои работы, которые легли в основу мирового учения. В 1781-м научная биография философа расширилась самой фундаментальной работой под названием «Критика чистого разума», где он разъясняет, что такое категорический императив. Личная жизнь Кант был далеко не красавцем, невысокий, с впалой грудью и узкими плечами. Несмотря на это, он всегда выглядел опрятным и ухоженным, ежемесячно ходил к парикмахеру и портному. Иммануил предпочитал затворничество, он так и не создал семью, потому что свято верил, что личная жизнь станет помехой занятиям наукой. Именно эта уверенность не дала ему повести под венец одну из красавиц, которые постоянно его окружали.
Долгое время я упорно избегала сочинения Иммануила Канта, так как ранее была знакома с его учением вкратце, и понимала, что у него сложная концепция, которая заставляет потрудиться и потратить намного больше времен на изучение. Концепция Канта тесно связана с его же философией, поэтому анализ учения о праве, морали и государстве в целом представляется долгим, порой даже муторным и сложным в силу того, что его философские труды не читала, просто наслышана о некоторых максимах Канта.
«Мы в центре мощнейшей когнитивной войны»: Алиханов объяснил, почему нужна ревизия учения Канта
Emmanuel Kant. 39 лет, Павлодар. Kant observed that men formed states to constrain their passions, but that each state sought to preserve its absolute freedom, even at the cost of “a lawless state of savagery.”. Veröffentlichungen von Kant, Emmanuel. Источник: РИА "Новости". Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников. Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile.
Daily Mail: Канте хочет перейти в «Интер»
Новости. Видеоигры. В Калининграде мероприятия в честь юбилея Иммануила Канта. Один из самых известных горожан родился 300 лет назад 22 апреля. Tag: Immanuel Kant. Chris Hedges: The Evil Within Us. March 22, 2021.
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