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Он практически голодал, и не отказывался от помощи более богатых однокурсников. Случалось так, что ему нечего было обуть, тогда он одалживал ботинки у друзей, и шел на лекции. Спасение молодой человек находил в философии, он считал, что вещи должны подчиняться человеку, а не наоборот. В 16 Кант стал студентом Кенигсбергского университета. Именно там он знакомится с преподавателем Мартином Кнутценом, пиетистом и вольфианцем, который открыл Канту учения Исаака Ньютона , оказавшие на молодого человека колоссальное влияние. Кант учился очень хорошо, несмотря на материальные трудности.
Он отдавал предпочтение физике, математике, философии. Теология не стала его любимым предметом, поэтому он посетил всего одно занятие, и то из благодарности к пастору Шульцу. Философия По мнению ученых, биография Канта состоит из двух периодов — докритического и критического. В докритическом периоде начала формироваться философская мысль Канта, он медленно избавлялся от влияния учения Христиана Вольфа, которое в те годы занимало господствующие позиции в Германии. В критическом периоде философ возносит метафизику к наукам, создает новое учение, основанное на активности сознания.
Свое первое сочинение под названием «Мысли об истинной оценке живых сил» Кант написал еще в годы учебы в университете. Большое влияние на него оказал преподаватель Кнутцен. Работа попала в печать только в 1749-м, благодаря стараниям и материальной поддержке дядюшки Рихтера. Иммануил не получил университетский диплом. В 1746 году умер отец, забота о материальном благополучии семьи легла на его плечи.
Кант находит работу домашнего учителя и на протяжении долгих десяти лет учит детишек из богатых семей. Все свободное время молодой человек посвящал написанию философских трудов, которые впоследствии стали основой его учения. В 1755-м философ возвращается в родной вуз. Его цель — защита диссертации «Об огне» и получение степени магистра. Осенью того же года он представил свою новую работу «Новое освещение первых принципов метафизического познания» и стал доктором наук.
Теперь он имеет право преподавать в университете и незамедлительно воспользовался этой возможностью. Он учил студентов логике и метафизике. Самой интересной работой первого периода философской деятельности Канта ученые назвали «Всеобщую естественную историю и теорию неба». В ней изложена история происхождения Вселенной, причем с точки зрения физики, а не теологии. В том же периоде Кант занялся изучением теории пространства с точки зрения физики.
Он верил в то, что Высший Разум существует, и именно он положил начало жизни на Земле. Иммануил говорил, что существование материи доказывает существование Бога. Он считал, что за материальными вещами обязательно стоит их Создатель. Именно эта мысль отражена в его труде под названием «Единственно возможное основание для доказательства бытия Бога».
Канте выступал за «Челси» с 2016 года. Полузащитник провел за лондонцев 269 матчей, в которых забил 13 голов и отдал 16 результативных передач. Читайте также.
Kant calls this immanent metaphysics or the metaphysics of experience, because it deals with the essential principles that are immanent to human experience. In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located. We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition. Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way. In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way. Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4.
Neither stars nor even galaxies would survive a disaster like this. If the second hypothesis is correct and dark energy is really a quintessence, then the future may hold a lot of amazing and unpleasant surprises. Story Saved You can find this story in My Bookmarks.
«Эммануил Кант скачать все альбомы»: в социальных сетях шутят о философе
| Новая экспозиция, первая книга, премьера лекции и стендап | Писатель Марк Мэнсон рассказал об этическом принципе, на котором базируется философия Канта — мыслителя, чьи идеи актуальны до сих пор. |
| Голосование "Великие имена": в самолётах Канта уже называют "Эммануилом" | Источник: РИА "Новости". |
| Собрались с мыслями. 300 лет Иммануилу Канту. В чем причины русского "антикантианства"? 25.04.2024 | Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. |
| Я живу в Калининграде. Как мы отпраздновали День рождения Иммануила Канта? С вдохновением... | Emmanuel Kant слушать лучшее онлайн бесплатно в хорошем качестве на Яндекс Музыке. |
Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте
These questions are transcending because their point is not to get an understanding of one definite being from other being; rather, it is an understanding of existence itself that each question seeks at the boundary of existence, from principles that do not belong to existence as objects of cognition. He stops at the boundary. What his transcending in thoughts of possibility clarifies, together with the mode of our existence, is its phenomenality as an expression of our assurance of intrinsic Being.
He added that any prudent owner must deal with the inheritance received, and said that Russian thought often opposed Kant. Moreover, the Russian Federation now has plenty of German trophies. Recently, a slightly damaged Leopard 2A5 tank was removed from the battlefield. It is strange that Mr.
In what was one of his final acts expounding a stance on philosophical questions, Kant opposed these developments and publicly denounced Fichte in an open letter in 1799. Kant always cut a curious figure in his lifetime for his modest, rigorously scheduled habits, which have been referred to as clocklike. Heinrich Heine observed the magnitude of "his destructive, world-crushing thoughts" and considered him a sort of philosophical "executioner", comparing him to Robespierre with the observation that both men "represented in the highest the type of provincial bourgeois.
Nature had destined them to weigh coffee and sugar, but Fate determined that they should weigh other things and placed on the scales of the one a king, on the scales of the other a god. Originally, Kant was buried inside the cathedral, but in 1880 his remains were moved to a neo-Gothic chapel adjoining the northeast corner of the cathedral. Over the years, the chapel became dilapidated and was demolished to make way for the mausoleum, which was built on the same location. The tomb and its mausoleum are among the few artifacts of German times preserved by the Soviets after they captured the city. This new evidence of the power of human reason, called into question for many the traditional authority of politics and religion. In particular, the modern mechanistic view of the world called into question the very possibility of morality; for, if there is no agency, there cannot be any responsibility. What should I do? What may I hope? It argues that even though we cannot, strictly know that we are free, we can—and for practical purposes, must—think of ourselves as free.
In brief, Kant argues that the mind itself necessarily makes a constitutive contribution to knowledge , that this contribution is transcendental rather than psychological, and that to act autonomously is to act according to rational moral principles. First, Kant makes a distinction in terms of the source of the content of knowledge: Cognitions a priori: "cognition independent of all experience and even of all the impressions of the senses". Cognitions a posteriori: cognitions that have their sources in experience—that is, which are empirical. These can also be called "judgments of clarification". Synthetic proposition: a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept; e. These can also be called "judgments of amplification". All analytic propositions are a priori it is analytically true that no analytic proposition could be a posteriori. By contrast, a synthetic proposition is one the content of which includes something new. The truth or falsehood of a synthetic statement depends upon something more than what is contained in its concepts.
The most obvious form of synthetic proposition is a simple empirical observation. This is because, unlike a posteriori cognition, a priori cognition has "true or strict... It is the twofold aim of the Critique both to prove and to explain the possibility of this knowledge. In general terms, the former is a non-discursive representation of a particular object, and the latter is a discursive or mediate representation of a general type of object. Knowledge generated on this basis, under certain conditions, can be synthetic a priori. In this "transcendental dialectic", Kant argues that many of the claims of traditional rationalist metaphysics violate the criteria he claims to establish in the first, "constructive" part of his book. Something is "transcendental" if it is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, and "idealism" denotes some form of mind-dependence that must be further specified. It argues that all genuine knowledge requires a sensory component, and thus that metaphysical claims that transcend the possibility of sensory confirmation can never amount to knowledge. On this particular view, the thing-in-itself is not numerically identical the phenomenal empirical object.
Kant also spoke of the thing in itself or transcendent object as a product of the human understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some interpreters argue that the thing in itself does not represent a separate ontological domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of the understanding alone; this is known as the "two-aspect" view.
День рождения философа Кафедральный собор отмечает каждый год, но только в этот раз празднику посвятили три дня, презентовав новую экспозицию в музее Иммануила Канта и даже представив книгу, изданную Кафедральным собором и рассказывающую об идеях великого мыслителя просто. Изменилось не только содержание, но и оформление - в залах установили новый профессиональный свет, заменили травмоопасные лестницы и сделали косметический ремонт. Сегодня экспозиция насчитывает более 2000 предметов и решена с использованием современных технологий - появились монофоны, игры, мультимедийные инсталляции. Есть несколько залов, где мы интерактивные приемы используем. В зале "Кенигсбергское время", например, можно услышать цитаты известных людей определенной эпохи - мы о пяти веках Кенигсберга говорим. Надели мононаушник — слышим Иммануила Канта, который рассуждает о городе. Надели другой - мы уже в двадцатом столетии, слышим Маяковского, который прилетал в Кенигсберг и из Девау ехал на машине в Берлин.
Мне кажется, это очень интересно.
Иммануил Кант: философ, присягнувший на верность Российской империи
Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way. In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world.
So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way. Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door.
Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4.
It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind. The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world. Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysical deduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction. But since categories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules for making judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives at his table of categories by considering how each logical function would structure judgments about objects within our spatio-temporal forms of intuition. For example, he claims that categorical judgments express a logical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to the ontological relation between substance and accident; and the logical form of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that corresponds to cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, the transcendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious by representing an objective world of substances that interact according to causal laws. To see why this further condition is required, consider that so far we have seen why Kant holds that we must represent an objective world in order to be self-conscious, but we could represent an objective world even if it were not possible to relate all of our representations to this objective world. For all that has been said so far, we might still have unruly representations that we cannot relate in any way to the objective framework of our experience. So I must be able to relate any given representation to an objective world in order for it to count as mine.
On the other hand, self-consciousness would also be impossible if I represented multiple objective worlds, even if I could relate all of my representations to some objective world or other. In that case, I could not become conscious of an identical self that has, say, representation 1 in space-time A and representation 2 in space-time B. It may be possible to imagine disjointed spaces and times, but it is not possible to represent them as objectively real. So self-consciousness requires that I can relate all of my representations to a single objective world. The reason why I must represent this one objective world by means of a unified and unbounded space-time is that, as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time are the pure forms of human intuition. If we had different forms of intuition, then our experience would still have to constitute a unified whole in order for us to be self-conscious, but this would not be a spatio-temporal whole. So Kant distinguishes between space and time as pure forms of intuition, which belong solely to sensibility; and the formal intuitions of space and time or space-time , which are unified by the understanding B160—161. These formal intuitions are the spatio-temporal whole within which our understanding constructs experience in accordance with the categories. So Kant concludes on this basis that the understanding is the true law-giver of nature. Our understanding does not provide the matter or content of our experience, but it does provide the basic formal structure within which we experience any matter received through our senses.
He holds that there is a single fundamental principle of morality, on which all specific moral duties are based. He calls this moral law as it is manifested to us the categorical imperative see 5. The moral law is a product of reason, for Kant, while the basic laws of nature are products of our understanding. There are important differences between the senses in which we are autonomous in constructing our experience and in morality. The moral law does not depend on any qualities that are peculiar to human nature but only on the nature of reason as such, although its manifestation to us as a categorical imperative as a law of duty reflects the fact that the human will is not necessarily determined by pure reason but is also influenced by other incentives rooted in our needs and inclinations; and our specific duties deriving from the categorical imperative do reflect human nature and the contingencies of human life. Despite these differences, however, Kant holds that we give the moral law to ourselves, as we also give the general laws of nature to ourselves, though in a different sense. Moreover, we each necessarily give the same moral law to ourselves, just as we each construct our experience in accordance with the same categories. Its highest principle is self-consciousness, on which our knowledge of the basic laws of nature is based. Given sensory data, our understanding constructs experience according to these a priori laws. Practical philosophy is about how the world ought to be ibid.
Its highest principle is the moral law, from which we derive duties that command how we ought to act in specific situations. Kant also claims that reflection on our moral duties and our need for happiness leads to the thought of an ideal world, which he calls the highest good see section 6. Given how the world is theoretical philosophy and how it ought to be practical philosophy , we aim to make the world better by constructing or realizing the highest good. In theoretical philosophy, we use our categories and forms of intuition to construct a world of experience or nature. In practical philosophy, we use the moral law to construct the idea of a moral world or a realm of ends that guides our conduct 4:433 , and ultimately to transform the natural world into the highest good. Theoretical philosophy deals with appearances, to which our knowledge is strictly limited; and practical philosophy deals with things in themselves, although it does not give us knowledge about things in themselves but only provides rational justification for certain beliefs about them for practical purposes. The three traditional topics of Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics were rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, which dealt, respectively, with the human soul, the world-whole, and God. In the part of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues against the Leibniz-Wolffian view that human beings are capable of a priori knowledge in each of these domains, and he claims that the errors of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics are due to an illusion that has its seat in the nature of human reason itself. According to Kant, human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God; and these ideas unavoidably produce the illusion that we have a priori knowledge about transcendent objects corresponding to them. This is an illusion, however, because in fact we are not capable of a priori knowledge about any such transcendent objects.
Nevertheless, Kant attempts to show that these illusory ideas have a positive, practical use. He thus reframes Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics as a practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. If this was not within his control at the time, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant, this is just common sense. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, I am free whenever the cause of my action is within me. If we distinguish between involuntary convulsions and voluntary bodily movements, then on this view free actions are just voluntary bodily movements. The proximate causes of these movements are internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral responsibility. Why not?
The reason, Kant says, is ultimately that the causes of these movements occur in time. Return to the theft example. The thief decided to commit the theft, and his action flowed from this decision. If that cause too was an event occurring in time, then it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc. All natural events occur in time and are thoroughly determined by causal chains that stretch backwards into the distant past. So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong sense. The root of the problem, for Kant, is time. But the past is out of his control now, in the present. Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth were never in his control.
In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it. Compatibilism, as Kant understands it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place. Even if the cause of my action is internal to me, if it is in the past — for example, if my action today is determined by a decision I made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood — then it is not within my control now. The real issue is not whether the cause of my action is internal or external to me, but whether it is in my control now. For Kant, however, the cause of my action can be within my control now only if it is not in time.
А в феврале текущего года Эммануэль Макрон так же драматично заявил, что Европа "не может исключить" возможности отправить войска на Украину, что вызвало бурную и почти полностью негативную реакцию. И вот Эммануэль Макрон опять, накануне важных выборов в Европейский парламент, возвращается к своему прославленному стилю. Выступая в зале университета Сорбонна, французский президент говорил на протяжении двух часов. Главной темой его выступления было следующее: Европа должна немедленно реагировать, если хочет выжить в мире, который меняется. Она может умереть. Все зависит от нашего выбора, и сделать его нужно немедленно", — заявил Эммануэль Макрон. Конечно, французский президент просто не может принять тот факт, что Европа меняется, преображаясь в нечто новое. Для него изменения за пределами намеченного пути и есть "смерть". С одной стороны, Макрон — этим он тоже прославился — призывает к укреплению европейской самодостаточности в обороне и экономике. Иными словами, он призывает к большей независимости от Соединенных Штатов Америки. Ведь то же самое президент Франции говорили и ранее, и именно когда у власти стоял Трамп. Однако когда в 2020 году к власти вернулся представитель типичного американского истеблишмента Джо Байден, у Макрона сразу исчезли претензии и к американскому влиянию в Европе, и к НАТО, которому он больше не приписывал "клиническую смерть". Поскольку нынешнее выступление отнюдь не первая речь Эммануэля Макрона на эту тему, можно заключить, что его позиция очень зависит от того, какая повестка сейчас доминирует, и он, несомненно, склоняется к ней. Кроме того, стоит отметить, что его речь прозвучала всего за несколько недель до выборов в Европейский парламент. Многие полагают, что тем самым Макрон пытается оживить весьма слабую кампанию его партии "Возрождение", которая очень отстает от своего соперника — партии Марин Ле Пен. Макрон: перед нами огромные риски, Европа может умеретьЭммануэль Макрон заявил, что Европа может умереть. Читатели Haber7 подмечают: французский президент надоел постоянными разговорами о войне и чьей-то гибели. Они припомнили ему "смерть мозга" у НАТО.
Еще одна бородатая шутка: «Вчера стирала пододеяльник в машине и поняла, что такое вещь в себе». Большого количества анекдотов не возникло, полагаю, потому, что редкие смеющиеся вряд ли могли сразу обсуждать эмпиризм, имманентность и кант его знает, что еще. Императив, например. Генрих Гейне про Канта писал, что невозможно ничего написать про жизнь Канта, поскольку и не было у него жизни. Не было, неужели? Так что знаем мы? Кроме того, что в городе Калининграде бывшем Кенинсберге какой-то отморозок на стене написал корявыми буквами: «Кант — лох». Мои мысли — мои скакуны 18 век, 1724 год, прусский город Кенигсберг. Шорник — это мастер такой, который изготавливает упряжь для лошадей. Уздечки, седла, шоры те же самые… Шорник был довольно успешен, женат на дочери другого шорника, которая родила ему множество детей, быстро и болезненно покинувших этот мир. Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников. Людей, которые готовят все, что обуздывает лошадей. Так что мысли-скакуны у Канта были очень упорядочены в дальнейшем. Следи за собой, будь осторожен Семья беднела медленно, но верно. В какой-то момент дом Канта официально был признан бедным отец старел, мать умерла, еще пожар был, был и новый дом. Зачислили в реестр бедных ремесленников, помогали дровами, снизили налоговую ставку. Потом мальчик получил шанс поступить в престижную гимназию. Он ненавидел ее, но изучил латынь, немного французского, основы английского языка. Одна из причин ненависти была такая: ученики этой гимназии должны были ежедневно вести дневник. В дневнике надо было вести «учет души». И фиксировать. Для Канта эта постоянная слежка за собой была неприемлема. Его университеты Университет был один — в Кенигсберге. Там была свобода, которой он не очень пользовался. Он просто ее ощущал.
Ольга Юрицына, заведующая секцией «Музей Иммануила Канта» в Кафедральном соборе Калининграда: «Отбирая цитаты, мы могли отобрать намного больше, чем 250. Остановились на этих, потому что нам кажется, что они больше отражают наш сегодняшний мир и те вопросы, те чаяния, которые беспокоят современных людей». Григорий Хуциев, и. Кстати, приветствует и прощается цифровой Иммануил Кант так же, как делал это реальный прототип. Например, фразой «Будьте счастливы в своем стремлении к истине» философ закончил одно из писем своему другу. Картина дня.
Immanuel Kant
Подробная информация о фильме Последние дни Иммануила Канта на сайте Кинопоиск. подкасты – радио sputnik, эммануэль макрон, нато, евросоюз, мулен руж, вторая мировая война (1939-1945), европа, польша, россия, анджей дуда, политика – радио sputnik, боевые действия. Иммануил Кант родился 22 апреля 1724 года в Кенигсберге, Пруссия, в небогатой семье ремесленника. Experts at Emmanuel Kant Baltic Federal University (BFU) believe this would be caused by so-called “acceleration of dark matter”. It is based on three key theories about what impacts dark energy would. An unrelated news platform with which you have had no contact builds a profile based on that viewing behaviour, marking space exploration as a topic of possible interest for other videos. Полузащитник Н’Голо Канте после подписания контракта с саудовским клубом «Аль-Иттихад» приобрел профессиональный футбольный клуб в Бельгии. Об этом сообщает журналист Саша.
Канте может перейти в «Арсенал» летом
Кафедральный собор принимал Международный Кантовский конгресс, в котором в этом году участвовали 500 ученых из 23 стран. В 15 часов сотую, юбилейную, лекцию прочел профессор БФУ Леонард Александрович Калинников, посвятивший Канту более 180 статей и 8 монографий. Традиционно украсили могилу мыслителя цветами в 17. Несколько лет назад она была написана специально для этого места и с тех пор больше нигде не исполнялась. Главным компонентом спектакля о Канте, где Дмитрий Минченок проживает жизнь человека, которого все признают великим, остается импровизация. Гений в науке - в жизни один из нас. Он страдал, как мы, любил, как мы, и я ищу эти точки соприкосновения, где он является обычным человеком с необычными слабостями. Полноправным героем драмы остается музыка - музыка Баха, Генделя и других композиторов сопровождает то, что происходит внутри Канта.
Мы слишком наивны", — отметил он. Что касается его заявления, сделанного в феврале, когда он не исключил отправки войск на Украину, то вчера он сказал, что "стратегическая двусмысленность" является важной частью нового геополитического порядка. Мы не просто маленькая часть Запада", — подчеркнул президент Франции.
Также, по его словам, одна из серьезнейших угроз для существования Европы — ее собственная деморализация. Мы не такие, как остальные. Мы никогда не должны забывать об этом.
Европа не просто кусок земли — это концепция человечества", — подчеркнул Эммануэль Макрон. Россия вынуждает Макрона вновь призывать к "европейскому кредиту" ради инвестиций в вооружениеВо время выступления в Сорбонне Эммануэль Макрон затронул вопрос безопасности Европы из-за "угрозы со стороны России", пишет Le Figaro. Французский президент в очередной раз громко заявил, что континенту необходимо вооружаться.
Читатели издания не оценили эту воинственность — и кое-чем Макрона пристыдили. Речь об идеологии, которая, как ее ни маскировали, по своей сути является опасной, ксенофобской, империалистической и милитаристской. Многочисленные американские войны наглядно демонстрируют последствия этой идеологии.
Эммануэль Макрон, по-видимому, хотел бы скопировать модель и перенести ее на Европу. При этом он понимает, что вассальный статус Европы в отношениях с США, — серьезное препятствие к реализации этой задумки. Правда, как я уже писал, вассальный статус не мешает Макрону, когда, по его мнению, не время возмущаться, и движут им в эти моменты исключительно французские, а не европейские интересы.
Кроме того, слова о том, что Европа "особенная", конечно, справедливы, но не в том смысле или не только в том, о котором говорит французский президент. Ведь Европа — колыбель колониализма, тяжелой и жестокой эксплуатации остального мира. Вспомним, что именно Франция была одним из лидеров этого порядка при всех ее прогрессивных достижениях, которые у нее не отнять, но которые ее и не оправдывают.
In particular, the modern mechanistic view of the world called into question the very possibility of morality; for, if there is no agency, there cannot be any responsibility. What should I do? What may I hope? It argues that even though we cannot, strictly know that we are free, we can—and for practical purposes, must—think of ourselves as free. In brief, Kant argues that the mind itself necessarily makes a constitutive contribution to knowledge , that this contribution is transcendental rather than psychological, and that to act autonomously is to act according to rational moral principles. First, Kant makes a distinction in terms of the source of the content of knowledge: Cognitions a priori: "cognition independent of all experience and even of all the impressions of the senses".
Cognitions a posteriori: cognitions that have their sources in experience—that is, which are empirical. These can also be called "judgments of clarification". Synthetic proposition: a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept; e. These can also be called "judgments of amplification". All analytic propositions are a priori it is analytically true that no analytic proposition could be a posteriori. By contrast, a synthetic proposition is one the content of which includes something new.
The truth or falsehood of a synthetic statement depends upon something more than what is contained in its concepts. The most obvious form of synthetic proposition is a simple empirical observation. This is because, unlike a posteriori cognition, a priori cognition has "true or strict... It is the twofold aim of the Critique both to prove and to explain the possibility of this knowledge. In general terms, the former is a non-discursive representation of a particular object, and the latter is a discursive or mediate representation of a general type of object. Knowledge generated on this basis, under certain conditions, can be synthetic a priori.
In this "transcendental dialectic", Kant argues that many of the claims of traditional rationalist metaphysics violate the criteria he claims to establish in the first, "constructive" part of his book. Something is "transcendental" if it is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, and "idealism" denotes some form of mind-dependence that must be further specified. It argues that all genuine knowledge requires a sensory component, and thus that metaphysical claims that transcend the possibility of sensory confirmation can never amount to knowledge. On this particular view, the thing-in-itself is not numerically identical the phenomenal empirical object. Kant also spoke of the thing in itself or transcendent object as a product of the human understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some interpreters argue that the thing in itself does not represent a separate ontological domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of the understanding alone; this is known as the "two-aspect" view.
Whereas the former was concerned with the contributions of the sensibility, the latter is concerned, first, with the contributions of the understanding "Transcendental Analytic" and, second, with the faculty of reason as the source of both metaphysical errors and genuine regulatory principles "Transcendental Dialectic". The "Transcendental Analytic" is further divided into two sections. The first, "Analytic of Concepts", is concerned with establishing the universality and necessity of the pure concepts of the understanding i. The second, "Analytic of Principles", is concerned with the application of those pure concepts in empirical judgments. This second section is longer than the first and is further divided into many sub-sections. These twelve basic categories define what it is to be a thing in general—that is, they articulate the necessary conditions according to which something is a possible object of experience.
These, in conjunction with the a priori forms of intuition, are the basis of all synthetic a priori cognition. The first, known as the "metaphysical deduction", proceeds analytically from a table of the Aristotelian logical functions of judgment.
He urged Europe to be more a master of its own destiny, saying in the past it was over-dependent on Russia for energy and Washington for security. However, many EU officials believe there is currently no credible alternative to the US military umbrella, and some suspect Macron of pushing French industrial interests. Macron said Europe also risks falling behind economically in a context where global free-trade rules are being challenged by major competitors, and he said it should aim to become a global leader in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space, biotechnologies and renewable energy.
Канте может перейти в «Арсенал» летом
Immanuel Kant e il nazismo | ». Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. С анимированным портретом 44-летнего Канта кисти Иоганна Готлиба Беккера теперь старается пообщаться почти каждый экскурсант Кафедрального собора.
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Kant jettisoned traditional theistic proofs for God as utilized by natural theology, but sought to ground ethics, in part, in his concepts of categorical imperatives or universal maxims to guide morality. Полузащитник Н’Голо Канте после подписания контракта с саудовским клубом «Аль-Иттихад» приобрел профессиональный футбольный клуб в Бельгии. Об этом сообщает журналист Саша. не столько повествование о «последних днях» немецкого философа, сколько собрание любопытных фактов, легенд и баек об
Главное правило жизни, которому учит философия Канта
| Emmanuel Kant Duarte - DEV Community | Лоран Канте родился в 1961 году в семье школьных учителей, киноискусство он изучал сначала в Марселе, а потом — в парижской Высшей школе кинематографистов. |
| Новая экспозиция, первая книга, премьера лекции и стендап | Адмиралы Балтийского флота уверены, что Канта звали Эммануэль. Эммануэль Кант.#кант #балтфлот |
| Daily Mail: Канте хочет перейти в «Интер» | Полузащитник «Челси» Н'Голо Канте дал предварительное согласие на переход в «Арсенал» по окончании сезона, сообщает Fichajes. |
| Я живу в Калининграде. Как мы отпраздновали День рождения Иммануила Канта? С вдохновением... | Иммануил Кант – самый русский из европейских и самый европейский из русских философов. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге – сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет даже. |
| Emmanuel Kant — слушать онлайн бесплатно на Яндекс Музыке в хорошем качестве | [–] Emmanuel__Kant 2 points3 points4 points 1 year ago (0 children). I have allways the high cost champion. |
Immanuel Kant and Nazism
В рамках международного Кантовского конгресса в Калининграде инициаторы развития «Балтийской платформы» – ИМЭМО РАН, МГИМО МИД России, БФУ имени И. Канта при. President Emmanuel Macron, during a speech on Europe, in the amphitheater of the Sorbonne University, Paris, April 25, 2024. не столько повествование о «последних днях» немецкого философа, сколько собрание любопытных фактов, легенд и баек об Иммануил Кант родился 22 апреля 1724 года в Кенигсберге, Пруссия, в небогатой семье ремесленника.