1. (noun) A lazy cowboy who neglects their duties on a farm or ranch. 2. (noun) A rural person in an urban environment, such as an office, who's mannersisms are notably different, less competitive, and often performed at a slower pace than the urbanites. The term may be used in either an endearing or. Sometimes, the urge to do something bad overcomes us, or we do not think about the consequences of our actions. Either way, whenever our behaviour is deemed undesirable, we are punished. Punishments keep us in line and are supposed to make us reflect on our actions. The place where punishments are. Дидактический материал для оформления доски на английском языке. If the IRS rejected your request to remove a penalty, you may be able to request an Appeals conference or hearing. You have 30 days from the date of the rejection letter to file your request for an appeal.
Штрафы английских игроков за скандальные высказывания в социальных сетях достигли 350 тысяч фунтов
offers free real time quotes, portfolio, streaming charts, financial news, live stock market data and more. Leicester's return to the English top-flight was confirmed at the first time of asking as Leeds suffered a shock 4-0 hammering against QPR at Loftus Road and celebrations got well underway in the Midlands. offers free real time quotes, portfolio, streaming charts, financial news, live stock market data and more. Власти Великобритании ужесточат наказание за нарушение закона о шпионаже, увеличив срок до пожизненного заключения, сообщает The Daily Telegraph со ссылкой на главу британского МВД Прити Пател. Во время судебного разбирательства (court proceeding) выносят приговор (to pass verdict on smb) и назначают наказание (to mete out punishment to smb).
Наказание - перевод с русского на английский
Упражнения по теме "Преступление и наказание" (английский язык). Они встречаются в новостях, фильмах, повседневной жизни. Поэтому подборка на тему «Crime and punishment» («Виды преступлений и наказаний») на английском языке будет полезна абсолютно всем, не только юристам и сотрудникам правоохранительных органов. USA TODAY delivers current national and local news, sports, entertainment, finance, technology, and more through award-winning journalism, photos, and videos.
Oxford Guide to British and American Culture English vocabulary
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- русский - английский словарь
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A third alternative approach that has gained some prominence in recent years is grounded in belief in free will scepticism, the view that human behaviour is a result not of free will but of determinism, luck, or chance, and thus that the notions of moral responsibility and desert on which many accounts of punishment especially retributivist theories depend are misguided see s. As an alternative to holding offenders responsible, or giving them their just deserts, some free will sceptics see Pereboom 2013; Caruso 2021 instead endorse incapacitating dangerous offenders on a model similar to that of public health quarantines. Just as it can arguably be justified to quarantine someone carrying a transmissible disease even if that person is not morally responsible for the threat they pose, proponents of the quarantine model contend that it can be justified to incapacitate dangerous offenders even if they are not morally responsible for what they have done or for the danger they present. One question is whether the quarantine model is best understood as an alternative to punishment or as an alternative form of punishment. Beyond questions of labelling, however, such views also face various lines of critique. In particular, because they discard the notions of moral responsibility and desert, they face objections, similar to those faced by pure consequentialist accounts see s. International Criminal Law and Punishment Theoretical discussions of criminal punishment and its justification typically focus on criminal punishment in the context of domestic criminal law. But a theory of punishment must also have something to say about its rationale and justification in the context of international criminal law: about how we should understand, and whether and how we can justify, the punishments imposed by such tribunals as the International Criminal Court. For we cannot assume that a normative theory of domestic criminal punishment can simply be read across into the context of international criminal law see Drumbl 2007. Rather, the imposition of punishment in the international context raises distinctive conceptual and normative issues.
Such international intervention is only justified, however, in cases of serious harm to the international community, or to humanity as a whole. Crimes harm humanity as a whole, on this account, when they are group-based either in the sense that they are based on group characteristics of the victims or are perpetrated by a state or another group agent. Such as account has been subject to challenge focused on its harm-based account of crime Renzo 2012 and its claim that group-based crimes harm humanity as a whole A. Altman 2006. We might think, by contrast, that the heinousness of a crime or the existence of fair legal procedures is not enough. We also need some relational account of why the international legal community — rather than this or that domestic legal entity — has standing to call perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity to account: that is, why the offenders are answerable to the international community see Duff 2010. For claims of standing to be legitimate, they must be grounded in some shared normative community that includes the perpetrators themselves as well as those on behalf of whom the international legal community calls the perpetrators to account. For other discussions of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes, see W. Lee 2010; Wellman 2011; Giudice and Schaeffer 2012; Davidovic 2015.
Another important question is how international institutions should assign responsibility for crimes such as genocide, which are perpetrated by groups rather than by individuals acting alone. Such questions arise in the domestic context as well, with respect to corporations, but the magnitude of crimes such as genocide makes the questions especially poignant at the international level. Several scholars in recent years have suggested, however, that rather than focusing only on prosecuting and punishing members of the groups responsible for mass atrocities, it may sometimes be preferable to prosecute and punish the entire group qua group. A worry for such proposals is that, because punishment characteristically involves the imposition of burdens, punishment of an entire group risks inflicting punitive burdens on innocent members of the group: those who were nonparticipants in the crime, or perhaps even worked against it or were among its victims. In response to this concern, defenders of the idea of collective punishment have suggested that it need not distribute among the members of the group see Erskine 2011; Pasternak 2011; Tanguagy-Renaud 2013; but see Hoskins 2014b , or that the benefits of such punishment may be valuable enough to override concerns about harm to innocents see Lang 2007: 255. Many coercive measures are imposed even on those who have not been convicted, such as the many kinds of restriction that may be imposed on people suspected of involvement in terrorism, or housing or job restrictions tied merely to arrests rather than convictions. The legal measures are relevant for punishment theorists for a number of reasons, but here we note just two: First, at least some of these restrictive measures may be best regarded as as additional forms of punishment see Lippke 2016: ch. For such measures, we must ask whether they are or can be made to be consistent with the principles and considerations we believe should govern impositions of punishment. Second, even if at least some measures are not best regarded as additional forms of punishment, we should ask what justifies the state in imposing additional coercive measures on those convicted of crimes outside the context of the punishment itself see Ashworth and Zedner 2011, 2012; Ramsay 2011; Ashworth, Zedner, and Tomlin 2013; Hoskins 2019: chs.
For instance, if we regard punishment as the way in which offenders pay their debts to society, we can argue that it is at least presumptively unjustified for the state to impose additional burdensome measures on offenders once this debt has been paid. To say that certain measures are presumptively unjustified is not, of course, to establish that they are all-things-considered prohibited. Various collateral consequences — restrictions on employment or housing, for example — are often defended as public safety measures. We might argue see Hoskins 2019: ch. Public safety restrictions could only be justifiable, however, when there is a sufficiently compelling public safety interest, when the measures will be effective in serving that interest, when the measures will not do more harm than good, and when there are no less burdensome means of achieving the public safety aim. Even for public safety measures that meet these conditions, we should not lose sight of the worry that imposing such restrictions on people with criminal convictions but who have served their terms of punishment denies them the equal treatment to which they, having paid their debt, are entitled on this last worry, see, e. In addition to these formal legal consequences of a conviction, people with criminal records also face a range of informal collateral consequences, such as social stigma, family tensions, discrimination by employers and housing authorities, and financial challenges. These consequences are not imposed by positive law, but they may be permitted by formal legal provisions such as those that grant broad discretion to public housing authorities in the United States making admission decisions or facilitated by them such as when laws making criminal records widely accessible enable employers or landlords to discriminate against those with criminal histories. There are also widely documented burdensome consequences of a conviction to the family members or loved ones of those who are convicted, and to their communities.
These sorts of informal consequences of criminal convictions appear less likely than the formal legal consequences to constitute legal punishment, insofar as they are not intentionally imposed by the state but see Kolber 2012. Still, the informal collateral consequences of a conviction are arguably relevant to theorising about punishment, and we should examine when, if ever, such burdens are relevant to sentencing determinations on sentencing, see s. Further Issues A number of further important questions are relevant to theorising about punishment, which can only be noted here. First, there are questions about sentencing. Who should decide what kinds and what levels of sentence should be attached to different offences or kinds of offence: what should be the respective roles of legislatures, of sentencing councils or commissions, of appellate courts, of trial judges, of juries? What kinds of punishment should be available to sentencers, and how should they decide which mode of punishment is appropriate for the particular offence? Considerations of the meaning of different modes of punishment should be central to these questions see e. Second, there are questions about the relation between theory and practice — between the ideal, as portrayed by a normative theory of punishment, and the actualities of existing penal practice. Suppose we have come to believe, as a matter of normative theory, that a system of legal punishment could in principle be justified — that the abolitionist challenge can be met.
It is, to put it mildly, unlikely that our normative theory of justified punishment will justify our existing penal institutions and practices: it is far more likely that such a theory will show our existing practices to be radically imperfect — that legal punishment as it is now imposed is far from meaning or achieving what it should mean or achieve if it is to be adequately justified see Heffernan and Kleinig 2000. If our normative theorising is to be anything more than an empty intellectual exercise, if it is to engage with actual practice, we then face the question of what we can or should do about our current practices. The obvious answer is that we should strive so to reform them that they can be in practice justified, and that answer is certainly available to consequentialists, on the plausible assumption that maintaining our present practices, while also seeking their reform, is likely to do more good or less harm than abandoning them. But for retributivists who insist that punishment is justified only if it is just, and for communicative theorists who insist that punishment is just and justified only if it communicates an appropriate censure to those who deserve it, the matter is harder: for to maintain our present practices, even while seeking their radical reform, will be to maintain practices that perpetrate serious injustice see Murphy 1973; Duff 2001, ch. Finally, the relation between the ideal and the actual is especially problematic in the context of punishment partly because it involves the preconditions of just punishment. That is to say, what makes an actual system of punishment unjust ified might be not its own operations as such what punishment is or achieves within that system , but the absence of certain political, legal and moral conditions on which the whole system depends for its legitimacy see Duff 2001, ch. Recent scholarship on punishment has increasingly acknowledged that the justification of punishment depends on the justification of the criminal law more generally, and indeed the legitimacy of the state itself see s. For example, if the state passes laws criminalising conduct that is not justifiably prohibited, then this calls into question the justification of the punishment it imposes for violations of these laws. Similarly, if the procedures by which criminal justice officials apprehend, charge, and prosecute individuals are unjustified, then the subsequent inflictions of punishment will be unjustified as well see Ristroph 2015 and 2016; on specific aspects of criminal procedure, see, e.
Bibliography Primoratz 1999, Honderich 2005, Ellis 2012, and Brooks 2013 are useful introductory books. Duff and Garland 1994; Ashworth, von Hirsch; and Roberts 2009; and Tonry 2011 are useful collections of readings. Adelsberg, L. Guenther, and S. Adler, J. Alexander, L. Allais, L. Altman, A. Altman, M.
Anderson, J. Ardal, P. Ashworth, A. Roberts eds. Duff and S. Zedner, and P. Tomlin eds. Bagaric, M. Baker, B.
Cragg ed. Barnett, R. Becker, L. Bennett, C. Flanders and Z. Hoskins eds. Bentham, J. Berman, M. Green eds.
Bianchi, H. Bickenbach, J. Boonin, D. Bottoms, A. Ashworth and M. Wasik eds. Braithwaite, J. Tonry, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 241—367. Brettschneider, C.
Brooks, T. Brown, J. Brownlee, K. Brudner, A. Burgh, R. Caruso, G. Chau, P. Chiao, V. Christie, N.
British Journal of Criminology, 17: 1—15. Ciocchetti, C. Cogley, Z. Timpe and C. Boyd eds. Cottingham, J. Dagger, R. Laborde and J. Maynor eds.
Daly, K. Davidovic, J. Davis, A. New York: Seven Stories Press. Davis, L. Davis, M. Deigh, J. Demetriou, D. Dempsey, M.
Dimock, S. Dolinko, D. Dolovich, S. Drumbl, M. Duff, R. Besson and J.
My parents did not give me enough pocket money 5. Poverty pushed me into crime Слайд 13 1. They also tell you what your rights are. A law exists because a majority of the people in the country agrees with it. Laws are compulsory. They are backed up by punishment 4. A law exists because it promotes the health or safety of everyone in society seat belt Слайд 14 5. Laws protect everybody. Without the protection of law each person could be under threat from everyone else in society.
This known pathway clearly depicts a systemic issue—one that warrants attention and remediation.
The penalty for which is five years in a federal prison. Они понесут наказание. И я также знаю, что ты сидишь тут передо мной только потому, что думаешь, что наказание, которое я могу назначить, не будет иметь значения. Напомните, каково наказание, если вас признают виновным в убийстве в вашей стране? Our brave and dutiful officials will quell the rebellion - Да там, в основном, отбывающие наказание впервые. Mostly first-time offenders. Они не впервые отбывают наказание. Первый же пропущенный рабочий день - и он начнет отбывать наказание в Синг-синг. The first day of work he misses is the day he begins his sentence at sing sing. Это наказание. Оно повторяется. В наказание за то, что ты мне помогаешь, ты был отдан другому фею в собственность? So as punishment for helping me, you were given to another Fae as property? Они несут полную ответсвенность за меня, пока мое наказание не закончится. They become completely responsible for me until my punishment is fulfilled. Будет интересно посмотреть, какое наказание он придумает для тебя. It will be fun to see what sort of punishment he comes up with for you. Скажи мне, когда именно наказание виновных стало для тебя важнее помощи невинным?
В Британии ввели уголовное наказание за угрозы в интернете и издевательство над людьми с эпилепсией
В Британии ввели уголовное наказание за угрозы в интернете и издевательство над людьми с эпилепсией Фото: 123rf. Новость об этом появилась на сайте правительства. Под действие закона попадает также рассылка откровенных фотографий человека без его ведома, отправка фальшивых новостей с целью причинения существенного вреда и распространение контента, побуждающего пользователей к селфхарму. Последнее преступление часто направлено на детей, поэтому за него грозит самое суровое наказание — до 5 лет лишения свободы.
As for sexual orientation, although article 534 of the Penal Code stated that sexual intercourse contrary to nature was punishable, two court decisions had indicated that article 534 did not apply to homosexuals. UN-2 В рамках пенитенциарной системы телесные наказания являются противозаконными в качестве меры наказания за совершенное преступление и в качестве дисциплинарной меры в пенитенциарных учреждениях In the penal system, corporal punishment is unlawful as a sentence for crime and as a disciplinary measure in penal institutions MultiUn Кроме того, Уголовно-процессуальный кодекс гарантирует им доступ к адвокату, а также устанавливает, что заявления, сделанные под пыткой, не могут быть использованы в качестве доказательств, а Закон о компенсации в сфере уголовного наказания предусматривает, что все лица, незаконно задержанные или подвергнутые актам пытки во время нахождения под стражей, имеют право требовать материальной компенсации. In addition, they were guaranteed access to a lawyer by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which also stipulated that statements obtained through torture could not be used as evidence, and the Penal Compensation Act provided that any person unlawfully held in detention or tortured during detention had the right to request financial compensation. UN-2 Просьба представить информацию о мерах если таковые имели место , принятых для профилактики "дедовщины" в армии, а также пыток и других жестоких, бесчеловечных или унижающих достоинство видов обращения и наказания в вооруженных силах, осуществляемых должностными лицами или с их ведома, молчаливого согласия или одобрения, в результате которых жертвам причиняется серьезный физический и психический вред. Please provide information on the measures taken, if any, to prevent hazing dedovshchina in the military, as well as torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the armed forces, conducted by or with the consent, acquiescence or approval of officers, resulting in severe physical and mental harm to the victims.
UN-2 Дику нужно идти домой выполнять наказание. Dick has to go home and do his forfeit. It is to be noted that the severest punishment, that is eight years of imprisonment, is for the age group 15—18 and for the offenses which are punishable by death and life imprisonment for adults.
Статья подается в оригинале на английском и переводе перевод не дословный. Но главное, помимо практики английского языка, здесь есть о чем задуматься. News is bad for you — and giving up reading it will make you happier Не смотрите новости — это плохо на вас влияет и не делает вас счастливей. It leads to fear and aggression, and hinders your creativity and ability to think deeply. The solution?
Stop consuming it altogether. Они подавляют мышление, делают нас пассивными, убивают творчество. Есть ли решение? Перестаньте поглощать новости. News is bad for health In the past few decades, the fortunate among us have recognised the hazards of living with an overabundance of food obesity, diabetes and have started to change our diets. But most of us do not yet understand that news is to the mind what sugar is to the body. News is easy to digest. Unlike reading books and long magazine articles which require thinking , we can swallow limitless quantities of news flashes, which are bright-coloured candies for the mind.
Today, we have reached the same point in relation to information that we faced 20 years ago in regard to food. We are beginning to recognise how toxic news can be. Новости вредны для вашего здоровья Их чтение приводит к появлению страха и агрессии, мешает реализации творческого потенциала и лишает способности мыслить глубоко. Новости — то же самое, что сахар для тела. Они легко усваиваются. СМИ кормят нас небольшими кусочками тривиальных фактов, которые, на самом деле, нас не касаются и не заслуживают внимания. Вот почему мы никогда не испытываем насыщения. В отличие от чтения книг и длинных журнальных статей над которыми приходится размышлять , мы можем проглотить огромное количество пустых новостей.
News is irrelevant. Out of the approximately 10,000 news stories you have read in the last 12 months, name one that — because you consumed it — allowed you to make a better decision about a serious matter affecting your life, your career or your business. The point is: the consumption of news is irrelevant to you. The relevant versus the new is the fundamental battle of the current age. Media organisations want you to believe that news offers you some sort of a competitive advantage. Many fall for that. In reality, news consumption is a competitive disadvantage. The less news you consume, the bigger the advantage you have.
Новости не имеют значения Примерно из 10 000 историй, которые вы прочитали в последние 12 месяцев, назовите одну, которая позволила вам принять лучшее решение в серьезном деле, влияющем на вашу жизнь, вашу карьеру, или ваш бизнес. Потребление новостей не имеет отношения к вам. На самом деле, потребление новостей — это конкурентный недостаток. Чем меньше вы потребляете новостей, тем больше у вас преимуществ. News has no explanatory power. News items are bubbles popping on the surface of a deeper world. Will accumulating facts help you understand the world? Sadly, no.
The relationship is inverted. The more «news factoids» you digest, the less of the big picture you will understand. Новости ничего не объясняют Новости — как пузырьки на поверхности большого мира.
Refer to your rejection letter for the specific deadline. The two most common penalties that Appeals may remove abate are penalties that can have a reasonable cause: Failure to file Failure to pay Reasonable cause is relief IRS may grant when a taxpayer exercises ordinary business care and prudence in determining their tax obligations but is unable to comply with those obligations due to circumstances beyond their control.
Наказание — перевод на английский
Еще значения слова и перевод PUNISHMENT с английского на русский язык в англо-русских словарях и с русского на английский язык в русско-английских словарях. НАКАЗАНИЕ — НАКАЗАНИЕ, наказания, ср. 1. Взыскание, налагаемое имеющим право, власть или силу, на того, кто совершил преступление или проступок; кара. Тайский лидер угрожает наказанием за ложные новости о вакцине. Найдено 30 результатов перевода перевода фразы "наказание" с русского на английский. Значение, Синонимы, Антонимы.
Как будет "наказание" по-английски? Перевод слова "наказание"
And life punishes liars ruthlessly. Your punishment will teach you to love the truth. I admit I made that up, about you locking your wife and children in, sir. Скопировать Ну, в интернат, это ведь наказание?
Для меня это просто школа. I mean, to boarding school, to punish you? Я живу в корпусе персонала с родителями.
Кстати, не всех детей сюда посылают в наказание. Дети, откройте свои альбомы и достаньте карандаши. I live in the staff quarters, with my mum and dad.
And by the way, all kids are not sent here to be punished. Children, open your sketchbooks and take out your pencils. Скопировать Я требую, чтобы ваше величество изгнал его из двора, и наказал его так, как сочтет нужным.
I demand that Your Majesty banish him from court with whatever other punishment Your Majesty sees fit.
Новостях и Дзене. Все главные и интересные новости тут.
Всего штрафы были выписаны за 121 сообщение, преимущественно внимание обращалось на записи в социальной сети Twitter. Больше всего пришлось заплатить бывшему защитнику "Челси" Эшли Коулу, который в 2012 году получил взыскание на 90 тысяч фунтов за оскорбление Футбольной ассоциации Англии. Подписывайтесь на новости футбола от Rusfootball.
If he be not guilty, you torture the innocent; for, in the eye of the law, every man is innocent whose crime has not been proved. Crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment. In proportion as punishments become more cruel, the minds of men, as a fluid rises to the same height with that which surrounds it, grow hardened and insensible; and the force of the passions still continuing in the space of an hundred years the wheel terrifies no more than formerly the prison. That a punishment may produce the effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the good expected from the crime, including in the calculation the certainty of the punishment, and the privation of the expected advantage. All severity beyond this is superfluous, and therefore tyrannical. The death penalty is pernicious to society, from the example of barbarity it affords. If the passions, or the necessity of war, have taught men to shed the blood of their fellow creatures, the laws, which are intended to moderate the ferocity of mankind, should not increase it by examples of barbarity, the more horrible as this punishment is usually attended with formal pageantry. Is it not absurd, that the laws, which detest and punish homicide, should, in order to prevent murder, publicly commit murder themselves?
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- 18 U.S. Code Part I - CRIMES
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| Punishment – наказание | Английский язык | Фотострана | Пост №1903008685 | Перевод ПОЛУЧИЛ НАКАЗАНИЕ на английский: get the punishment, get detention, receive the punishment, get him, gets punished. |
| Crime | The Independent | наказание, предусмотрено различной степени тяжести, в соответствии с совершенным преступлением! |
| Как будет "наказание" по-английски? Перевод слова "наказание" | Статья подается в оригинале (на английском) и переводе (перевод не дословный). |
18 U.S. Code Part I - CRIMES
Статья подается в оригинале (на английском) и переводе (перевод не дословный). Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Англичанину, осквернившему памятник советскому футболисту Федору Черенкову, грозит административное наказание, сообщает ТАСС. В статье рассмотрен перевод 'наказание' на английский язык с примером использования и полезными ссылками на другую лексику. перевод на английский язык, синонимы, произношение, примеры предложений, антонимы, определение.
18 U.S. Code Part I - CRIMES
Налагать на кого нибудь наказание. Заслужить наказание. Подвергнуться наказанию за что… … Толковый словарь Ушакова наказание — телесное, строгое, легкое, исправительное, уголовное , взыскание, кара, казнь, пеня, расправа, штраф, эпитимия. Ср … Словарь синонимов Наказание — Любая реакция, следующая за определенным событием и уменыпающая вероятность возникновения этого события в будущем. К примеру, если ребенка бранят каждый раз, когда он кормит собаку едой со стола, то в конце концов он прекратит это делать. Александр Пушкин Кто жалеет розги своей, тот ненавидит сына; а кто любит, тот с детства наказывает его.
Умение« Наказание » приобретает эффекты всех рун. Punish gains the effect of every rune.
Crusader Only. Наказание мира нашего было на Нем, и ранами Его мы исцелились. The chastisement for our peace was upon him, and by his stripes we are healed. Осужденные, отбывающие наказание в тюрьмах, вправе. Convicts serving their sentence in prisons may. Уголовное законодательство Хорватии предусматривает наказание за торговлю людьми независимо от формы эксплуатации.
Translated in English by Constance Garnett.
Роман «Преступление и наказание» на английском языке. Автор Ф. Перевод: Констанция Гарнетт.
Скажи мне, когда именно наказание виновных стало для тебя важнее помощи невинным? Tell me, when exactly did punishing the guilty become more important to you than helping the innocent? Поверить не могу! За что мне такое наказание! Ваша честь, каково наказание за мошенничество в честном штате Вайоминг? Your Honor, how does the fine state of Wyoming treat fraud?
Источники ФБР говорят, что Клейнфелтер сознался в убийстве Ванессы Хиски в обмен на гарантию того, что он не получит наказание за шпионаж. Донован верит в равноценное наказание. Donovan believes in mirrored punishment. Это не в первый раз, когда друг берет вину на себя, защищая того, кому грозит такое наказание, как депортация. Даниил В наказание за наши грехи. And even if we were to survive it, we would be very old. Вот толкование, О царь, и это наказание которое Всевышний дал господину моему, Царю. This is the interpretation, oh king, and this is the decree that the Most High has issued against my lord, the king. Что если наказание за эту преданность было бы его смертью?
What if the penalty for this devotion of his was death? Есть ли наказание меньше, чем смерть, которая его ждёт? Is there any penalty less than death which will do?
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For we have here a practice that inflicts, indeed seeks to inflict, significant hardship or burdens: how else could we hope to justify it than by showing that it brings consequential benefits sufficiently large to outweigh, and thus to justify, those burdens? However, when we try to flesh out this simple consequentialist thought into something closer to a full normative account of punishment, problems begin to appear. A consequentialist must justify punishment if she is to justify it at all as a cost-effective means to certain independently identifiable goods for two simple examples of such theories, see Wilson 1983; Walker 1991. Whatever account she gives of the final good or goods at which all action ultimately aims, the most plausible immediate good that a system of punishment can bring is the reduction of crime. A rational consequentialist system of law will define as criminal only conduct that is in some way harmful; in reducing crime we will thus be reducing the harms that crime causes. It is commonly suggested that punishment can help to reduce crime by deterring, incapacitating, or reforming potential offenders though for an argument that incapacitation is not a genuinely punitive aim, see Hoskins 2016: 260.
There are of course other goods that a system of punishment can bring. It can reassure those who fear crime that the state is taking steps to protect them—though this is a good that, in a well-informed society, will be achieved only insofar as the more immediate preventive goods are achieved. It can also bring satisfaction to those who want to see wrongdoers suffer — though to show that to be a genuine good, rather than merely a means of averting vigilantism and private revenge, we would need to show that it involves something more than mere vengeance, which would be to make sense of some version of retributivism. In consequentialist terms, punishment will be justified if it is an effective means of achieiving its aim, if its benefits outweigh its costs, and if there is no less burdensome means of achieving the same aim. It is a contingent question whether punishment can satisfy these conditions, and some objections to punishment rest on the empirical claim that it cannot — that there are more effective and less burdensome methods of crime reduction see Wootton 1963; Menninger 1968; Golash 2005: chs.
Our focus here, however, will be on the moral objections to consequentialist accounts of punishment — objections, basically, that crime-reductive efficiency does not suffice to justify a system of punishment. The most familiar line of objection to consequentialist penal theories contends that consequentialists would be committed to regarding manifestly unjust punishments the punishment of those known to be innocent, for instance, or excessively harsh punishment of the guilty to be in principle justified if they would efficiently serve the aim of crime reduction: but such punishments would be wrong, because they would be unjust see e. There are some equally familiar consequentialist responses to this objection. Another is to argue that in the real world it is extremely unlikely that such punishments would ever be for the best, and even less likely that the agents involved could be trusted reliably to pick out those rare cases in which they would be: thus we, and especially our penal officials, will do best if we think and act as if such punishments are intrinsically wrong and unjustifiable see e. Another objection to consequentialist accounts focuses not on potential wrongs done to the innocent but rather on the wrong allegedly done to the guilty.
Consequentialist punishment, on this objection, fails to respect the person punished as an autonomous moral agent. In Kantian terms, such punishment treats those punished as mere means to achieving some social good, rather than respecting them as ends in themselves Kant 1797: 473; Murphy 1973. One might argue that if punishment is reserved for those who voluntarily break the law, it does not treat them merely as means. Indeed, Kant himself suggested that as long as we reserve punishment only for those found guilty of crimes, then it is permissible to punish with an eye toward potential benefits Kant 1797: 473. As we have seen, though, insofar as such an approach relies on endorsing prohibitions on punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, the challenge remains that such constraints appear to be merely contingent if grounded in consequentialist considerations.
Conversely, if the constraints are more than merely contingent, it appears that they will be based on some deontological considerations, in which case the overall theory will no longer be purely consequentialist, but rather a mixed theory see s. The criminal law, and the institution of punishment, in a liberal society should treat offenders as still members of the polity who despite having violated its values could, and should, nonetheless re commit to these values. A possible response is that a penal system aimed at crime reduction through deterrence need not be exclusionary, as it treats all community members equally, namely as potential offenders Hoskins 2011a: 379—81. Retributivist Accounts Whereas consequentialist accounts regard punishment as justified instrumentally, as a means to achieving some valuable goal typically crime reduction , retributivist accounts contend that punishment is justified as an intrinsically appropriate, because deserved, response to wrongdoing but see Berman 2011 for an argument that some recent versions of retributivism actually turn it into a consequentialist theory. Penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but an in-principle sufficient reason for punishment only in principle, however, since there are good reasons — to do with the costs, both material and moral, of punishment — why we should not even try to punish all the guilty.
Negative retributivism, by contrast, provides not a positive reason to punish, but rather a constraint on punishment: punishment should be imposed only on those who deserve it, and only in proportion with their desert. Because negative retributivism represents only a constraining principle, not a positive reason to punish, it has been employed in various mixed accounts of punishment, which endorse punishment for consequentialist reasons but only insofar as the punishment is no more than is deserved see s. A striking feature of penal theorising during the last three decades of the twentieth century was a revival of positive retributivism — of the idea that the positive justification of punishment is to be found in its intrinsic character as a deserved response to crime see H. Morris 1968; N. Morris 1974; Murphy 1973; von Hirsch 1976; two useful collections of contemporary papers on retributivism are White 2011 and Tonry 2012.
Positive retributivism comes in very different forms Cottingham 1979. All can be understood, however, as attempting to answer the two central questions faced by any retributivist theory of punishment. Davis 1972 — and what do they deserve to suffer see Ardal 1984; Honderich 2005, ch. Second, even if they deserve to suffer, or to be burdened in some distinctive way, why should it be for the state to inflict that suffering or that burden on them through a system of criminal punishment Murphy 1985; Husak 1992 and 2015; Shafer-Landau 1996; Wellman 2009? One retributivist answer to these questions is that crime involves taking an unfair advantage over the law-abiding, and that punishment removes that unfair advantage.
The criminal law benefits all citizens by protecting them from certain kinds of harm: but this benefit depends upon citizens accepting the burden of self-restraint involved in obeying the law. The criminal takes the benefit of the self-restraint of others but refuses to accept that burden herself: she has gained an unfair advantage, which punishment removes by imposing some additional burden on her see H. Morris 1968; Murphy 1973; Sadurski 1985; Sher 1987, ch. This kind of account does indeed answer the two questions noted above. However, such accounts have internal difficulties: for instance, how are we to determine how great was the unfair advantage gained by a crime; how far are such measurements of unfair advantage likely to correlate with our judgements of the seriousness of crimes?
Davis 1992, 1996; for criticism, see Scheid 1990, 1995; von Hirsch 1990. Such accounts try to answer the first of the two questions noted above: crime deserves punishment in the sense that it makes appropriate certain emotions resentment, guilt which are satisfied by or expressed in punishment. Criminal wrongdoing should, we can agree, provoke certain kinds of emotion, such as self-directed guilt and other-directed indignation; and such emotions might typically involve a desire to make those at whom they are directed suffer. At the least we need to know more than we are told by these accounts about just what wrongdoers deserve to suffer, and why the infliction of suffering should be an appropriate way to express such proper emotions. For critical discussions of Murphy, see Murphy and Hampton 1988, ch.
On Moore, see Dolinko 1991: 555—9; Knowles 1993; Murphy 1999. See also Murphy 2003, 2012. More recently, critics of emotion-based retributivist accounts have contended that the emotions on which retributive and other deontological intuitions are based have evolved as mechanisms to stabilise cooperation; given that we have retributive emotions only because of their evolutionary fitness, it would be merely a coincidence if intuitions based on these emotions happened to track moral truths about, e. A problem with such accounts is that they appear to prove too much: consequentialist accounts also rely on certain evaluation intuitions about what has value, or about the proper way to respond to that which we value ; insofar as such intuitions are naturally selected, then it would be no less coincidental if they tracked moral truths than if retributive intuitions did so. Thus the consequentialist accounts that derive from these intuitions would be similarly undermined by this evolutionary argument see Kahane 2011; Mason 2011; but see Wiegman 2017.
A third version of retributivism holds that when people commit a crime, they thereby incur a moral debt to their victims, and punishment is deserved as a way to pay this debt McDermott 2001. This moral debt differs from the material debt that an offender may incur, and thus payment of the material debt returning stolen money or property, etc. Punishment as Communication Perhaps the most influential version of retributivism in recent decades seeks the meaning and justification of punishment as a deserved response to crime in its expressive or communicative character. On the expressive dimension of punishment, see generally Feinberg 1970; Primoratz 1989; for critical discussion, see Hart 1963: 60—69; Skillen 1980; M. Davis 1996: 169—81; A.
Lee 2019. Consequentialists can of course portray punishment as useful partly in virtue of its expressive character see Ewing 1927; Lacey 1988; Braithwaite and Pettit 1990 ; but a portrayal of punishment as a mode of deserved moral communication has been central to many recent versions of retributivism. The central meaning and purpose of punishment, on such accounts, is to convey the censure or condemnation that offenders deserve for their crimes. On other such accounts, the primary intended audience of the condemnatory message is the offender himself, although the broader society may be a secondary audience see Duff 2001: secs. Once we recognise that punishment can serve this communicative purpose, we can see how such accounts begin to answer the two questions that retributivists face.
First, there is an obviously intelligible justificatory relationship between wrongdoing and condemnation: whatever puzzles there might be about other attempts to explain the idea of penal desert, the idea that it is appropriate to condemn wrongdoing is surely unpuzzling. For other examples of communicative accounts, see especially von Hirsch 1993: ch. For critical discussion, see M. Davis 1991; Boonin 2008: 171—80; Hanna 2008; Matravers 2011a. Two crucial lines of objection face any such justification of punishment as a communicative enterprise.
The first line of critique holds that, whether the primary intended audience is the offender or the community generally, condemnation of a crime can be communicated through a formal conviction in a criminal court; or it could be communicated by some further formal denunciation issued by a judge or some other representative of the legal community, or by a system of purely symbolic punishments which were burdensome only in virtue of their censorial meaning. Is it because they will make the communication more effective see Falls 1987; Primoratz 1989; Kleinig 1991? And anyway, one might worry that the hard treatment will conceal, rather than highlight, the moral censure it should communicate see Mathiesen 1990: 58—73. One sort of answer to this first line of critique explains penal hard treatment as an essential aspect of the enterprise of moral communication itself. Punishment, on this view, should aim not merely to communicate censure to the offender, but to persuade the offender to recognise and repent the wrong he has done, and so to recognise the need to reform himself and his future conduct, and to make apologetic reparation to those whom he wronged.
His punishment then constitutes a kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes see Duff 2001, 2011b; see also Garvey 1999, 2003; Tudor 2001; Brownless 2007; Hus 2015; for a sophisticated discussion see Tasioulas 2006. This type of account faces serious objections see Bickenbach 1988; Ten 1990; von Hirsch 1999; Bagaric and Amarasekara 2000; Ciocchetti 2004; von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: ch. The second line of objection to communicative versions of retributivism — and indeed against retributivism generally — charges that the notions of desert and blame at the heart of retributivist accounts are misplaced and pernicious. One version of this objection is grounded in scepticism about free will. In response, retributivists may point out that only if punishment is grounded in desert can we provide more than contingent assurances against punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, or assurances against treating those punished as mere means to whatever desirable social ends see s.
Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness. To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system. After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020. In particular, Hart 1968: 9—10 pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution that is, what values or aims it fosters and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e.
See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46—56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. For example, whereas Hart endorsed a consequentialist rationale for punishment and nonconsequentialist side-constraints, one might instead endorse a retributivist rationale constrained by consequentialist considerations punishment should not tend to exacerbate crime, or undermine offender reform, etc. Alternatively, one might endorse an account on which both consequentialist and retributivist considerations features as rationales but for different branches of the law: on such an account, the legislature determines crimes and establishes sentencing ranges with the aim of crime reduction, but the judiciary makes sentencing decisions based on retributivist considerations of desert M. Critics have charged that hybrid accounts are ad hoc or internally inconsistent see Kaufman 2008: 45—49. In addition, retributivists argue that hybrid views that integrate consequentialist rationales with retributivist side-constraints thereby relegate retributivism to a merely subsidiary role, when in fact giving offenders their just deserts is a or the central rationale for punishment see Wood 2002: 303.
Also, because hybrid accounts incorporate consequentialist and retributivist elements, they may be subject to some of the same objections raised against pure versions of consequentialism or retributivism. For example, insofar as they endorse retributivist constraints on punishment, they face the thorny problem of explaining the retributivist notion of desert see s. Even if such side-constraints can be securely grounded, however, consequentialist theories of punishment face the broadly Kantian line of objection discussed earlier s. Some have contended that punishment with a consequentialist rationale does not treat those punished merely as means as long as it is constrained by the retributivist prohibitions on punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty see Walker 1980: 80—85; Hoskins 2011a. Still, a critic may argue that if we are to treat another with the respect due to her as a rational and responsible agent, we must seek to modify her conduct only by offering her good and relevant reasons to modify it for herself.
Punishment aimed at deterrence, incapacitation, or offender reform, however, does not satisfy that demand. A reformative system treats those subjected to it not as rational, self-determining agents, but as objects to be re-formed by whatever efficient and humane techniques we can find. An incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to preempt their future choices by incapacitating them. One strategy for dealing with them is to posit a two-step justification of punishment. The first step, which typically appeals to nonconsequentialist values, shows how the commission of a crime renders the offender eligible for, or liable to, the kinds of coercive treatment that punishment involves: such treatment, which is normally inconsistent with the respect due to us as rational agents or as citizens, and inconsistent with the Kantian means principle, is rendered permissible by the commission of the offence.
The second step is then to offer positive consequentialist reasons for imposing punishment on those who are eligible for it or liable to it: we should punish if and because this can be expected to produce sufficient consequential benefits to outweigh its undoubted costs. Further nonconsequentialist constraints might also be placed on the severity and modes of punishment that can be permitted: constraints either flowing from an account of just what offenders render themselves liable to, or from other values external to the system of punishment. We must ask, however, whether we should be so quick to exclude fellow citizens from the rights and status of citizenship, or whether we should not look for an account of punishment if it is to be justified at all on which punishment can still be claimed to treat those punished as full citizens. The common practice of denying imprisoned offenders the right to vote while they are in prison, and perhaps even after they leave prison, is symbolically significant in this context: those who would argue that punishment should be consistent with recognised citizenship should also oppose such practices; see Lippke 2001b; Journal of Applied Philosophy 2005; see also generally s. The consent view holds that when a person voluntarily commits a crime while knowing the consequences of doing so, she thereby consents to these consequences.
This is not to say that she explicitly consents to being punished, but rather than by her voluntary action she tacitly consents to be subject to what she knows are the consequences. Notice that, like the forfeiture view, the consent view is agnostic regarding the positive aim of punishment: it purports to tell us only that punishing the person does not wrong her, as she has effectively waived her right against such treatment. The consent view faces formidable objections, however. First, it appears unable to ground prohibitions on excessively harsh sentences: if such sentences are implemented, then anyone who subsequently violates the corresponding laws will have apparently tacitly consented to the punishment Alexander 1986. A second objection is that most offenders do not in fact consent, even tacitly, to their sentences, because they are unaware either that their acts are subject to punishment or of the severity of the punishment to which they may be liable.
For someone to have consented to be subject to certain consequences of an act, she must know of these consequences see Boonin 2008: 161—64. A third objection is that, because tacit consent can be overridden by explicit denial of consent, it appears that explicitly nonconsenting offenders could not be justifiably punished on this view ibid. Others offer contractualist or contractarian justifications of punishment, grounded in an account not of what treatment offenders have in fact tacitly consented to, but rather of what rational agents or reasonable citizens would endorse. The punishment of those who commit crimes is then, it is argued, rendered permissible by the fact that the offender himself would, as a rational agent or reasonable citizen, have consented to a system of law that provided for such punishments see e. For versions of this kind of argument, see Alexander 1980; Quinn 1985; Farrell 1985, 1995; Montague 1995; Ellis 2003 and 2012.
For criticism, see Boonin 2008: 192—207. For a particularly intricate development of this line of thought, grounding the justification of punishment in the duties that we incur by committing wrongs, see Tadros 2011; for critical responses, see the special issue of Law and Philosophy, 2013. One might argue that the Hegelian objection to a system of deterrent punishment overstates the tension between the types of reasons, moral or prudential, that such a system may offer. Punishment may communicate both a prudential and a moral message to members of the community. Even before a crime is committed, the threat of punishment communicates societal condemnation of an offense.
This moral message may help to dissuade potential offenders, but those who are unpersuaded by this moral message may still be prudentially deterred by the prospect of punishment. Similarly, those who actually do commit crimes may be dissuaded from reoffending by the moral censure conveyed by their punishment, or else by the prudential desire to avoid another round of hard treatment. Through its criminal statutes, a community declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community members to comply, whereas trials and convictions can communicate a message of deserved censure to the offender. Thus even if a system of deterrent punishment is itself regarded as communicating solely in prudential terms, it seems that the criminal law more generally can still communicate a moral message to those subject to it see Hoskins 2011a. A somewhat different attempt to accommodate prudential as well as moral reasons in an account of punishment begins with the retributivist notion that punishment is justified as a form of deserved censure, but then contends that we should communicate censure through penal hard treatment because this will give those who are insufficiently impressed by the moral appeal of censure prudential reason to refrain from crime; because, that is, the prospect of such punishment might deter those who are not susceptible to moral persuasion.
See Lipkin 1988, Baker 1992. For a sophisticated revision of this idea, which makes deterrence firmly secondary to censure, see von Hirsch 1993, ch. For critical discussion, see Bottoms 1998; Duff 2001, ch.
Роман «Преступление и наказание» на английском языке.
Автор Ф. Перевод: Констанция Гарнетт. The book was written in 1865 — 1866.
Скопировать А жизнь наказывает лгунов без любви и милосердия. Наказание же, научит тебя любить правду. Я признаюсь, что придумал, что Епископ запер жену и детей. And life punishes liars ruthlessly. Your punishment will teach you to love the truth. I admit I made that up, about you locking your wife and children in, sir. Скопировать Ну, в интернат, это ведь наказание? Для меня это просто школа. I mean, to boarding school, to punish you? Я живу в корпусе персонала с родителями. Кстати, не всех детей сюда посылают в наказание. Дети, откройте свои альбомы и достаньте карандаши. I live in the staff quarters, with my mum and dad. And by the way, all kids are not sent here to be punished.
The more cruel the punishments become, the more hardened and insensible people turn to be. All severity is superfluous, and therefore tyrannical. The death penalty is pernicious to society, it is the example of barbarity. If the passions, or the necessity of war, have taught men to shed blood of their fellow creatures, the laws, which are intended to moderate the ferocity of mankind, should not increase it by examples of barbarity. It is even more horrible that this punishment is usually attended with formal pageantry. It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them. This should be the fundamental principle of any good legislation. Под справедливостью мы понимаем узы, которые необходимо сохраняют интересы людей объединенными, без которых люди вернутся в первоначальное состояние варварства. Все наказания, которые превышают необходимость сохранения этой связи, являются по своей природе несправедливыми.