Полузащитник Н’Голо Канте после подписания контракта с саудовским клубом «Аль-Иттихад» приобрел профессиональный футбольный клуб в Бельгии. Об этом сообщает журналист Саша. Читайте последние новости на тему в ленте новостей на сайте РИА Новости. Подробная информация о фильме Последние дни Иммануила Канта на сайте Кинопоиск. На этой странице собраны самые актуальные новости университета БФУ им Канта. Does Scholz have the right to prohibit anyone from quoting Kant? Emmanuel Kant is a figure of world heritage, not a Scholtz pocket dog!
Новая экспозиция, первая книга, премьера лекции и стендап
Ректор БФУ им. Иммануила Канта Александр Федоров отметил: философия не эксклюзивное занятие, ею, осмысляя действительность и место в ней, занимается каждый. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is the central figure in modern philosophy. He synthesized early modern rationalism and empiricism, set the terms for much of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy. не столько повествование о «последних днях» немецкого философа, сколько собрание любопытных фактов, легенд и баек об French President Emmanuel Macron delivers a speech on Europe in the amphitheater of the Sorbonne University, Thursday, April 25 in Paris.
Последние дни Иммануила Канта (1994) Les derniers jours d Emmanuel Kant
Плеер автоматически запустится при технической возможности , если находится в поле видимости на странице Адаптивный размер Размер плеера будет автоматически подстроен под размеры блока на странице. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге — сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет даже был российским подданным. Тем не менее в нашей стране созданная им теория не столь популярна.
Родители мальчика заложили основы духовного воспитания сына, они сами были глубоко верующими людьми и принадлежали к лютеранской церкви, а если точнее, то к ее особому течению — пиетизму. Учение заключалось в том, что человек находится непрестанно на глазах у Господа, поэтому должен соблюдать личное благочестие. Именно мама прививала детям основы вероисповедания, знакомила их с красотой окружающего мира.
Проповеди в церкви и занятия, на которых изучали Библию, Анна Регина посещала вместе с детьми. Достаточно часто в доме Кантов можно было встретить доктора теологии Франца Шульца, который и заметил незаурядные способности Иммануила в изучении Библии, а еще умение выражать и отстаивать собственные суждения. Мальчику исполнилось 8, когда мама привела его в самую лучшую школу Кенигсберга. Это была гимназия им. Фридриха, и ее рекомендовал в качестве учебного заведения именно Шульц.
Он сел за школьную парту в 1732 году и провел там восемь лет. Уроки начинались в семь часов и продолжались до девяти. Главными предметами были Ветхий и Новый заветы, теология, география, латынь, греческий и немецкий языки. Изучение философии начиналось в старшей школе, и Иммануил всегда говорил, что этот предмет изучали неправильно. Заниматься математикой можно было только за деньги, к тому же, если у ученика имелось желание.
Родители уже видели сына в сане священника, но мальчик с большим интересом изучал латынь и мечтал в будущем стать преподавателем словесности. К тому же, ученикам религиозной школы приходилось подчиняться строгим правилам и нравам этого заведения, а Канту это очень не нравилось. Иммануил никогда не отличался крепким здоровьем, однако показывал отличные успехи в учебе, все благодаря природной сообразительности и недюжинным умственным способностям. В возрасте тринадцати лет мальчик потерял маму. Она долго болела и так и не смогла оправиться.
Семья влачила жалкое существование, Кант зачастую нуждался в самом элементарном. Он практически голодал, и не отказывался от помощи более богатых однокурсников. Случалось так, что ему нечего было обуть, тогда он одалживал ботинки у друзей, и шел на лекции. Спасение молодой человек находил в философии, он считал, что вещи должны подчиняться человеку, а не наоборот. В 16 Кант стал студентом Кенигсбергского университета.
Именно там он знакомится с преподавателем Мартином Кнутценом, пиетистом и вольфианцем, который открыл Канту учения Исаака Ньютона , оказавшие на молодого человека колоссальное влияние. Кант учился очень хорошо, несмотря на материальные трудности. Он отдавал предпочтение физике, математике, философии. Теология не стала его любимым предметом, поэтому он посетил всего одно занятие, и то из благодарности к пастору Шульцу. Философия По мнению ученых, биография Канта состоит из двух периодов — докритического и критического.
В докритическом периоде начала формироваться философская мысль Канта, он медленно избавлялся от влияния учения Христиана Вольфа, которое в те годы занимало господствующие позиции в Германии. В критическом периоде философ возносит метафизику к наукам, создает новое учение, основанное на активности сознания.
Отца будущего светила философии звали Иоганн Георг Кант, он был ремесленником-седельщиком. Мама — Анна Регина, занималась домом и растила двенадцать детей. Иммануил стал четвертым ребенком, многие из его братьев и сестер умерли в младенческом возрасте. Выжить удалось трем сестрам и двум братьям.
Детство Иммануила прошло в небольшом доме, который полностью сгорел во время пожара в 18-м веке. Юношеские годы Кант провел среди обычных ремесленников и рабочих, живших на окраине Кёнигсберга. Историкам так и не удалось точно выяснить, кем же был по национальности великий философ. Одни утверждали, что предки по отцовской линии жили в Шотландии, однако эта информация так и осталась неподтвержденной. Родня по линии матери проживала в немецком городе Нюрнберге. Родители мальчика заложили основы духовного воспитания сына, они сами были глубоко верующими людьми и принадлежали к лютеранской церкви, а если точнее, то к ее особому течению — пиетизму.
Учение заключалось в том, что человек находится непрестанно на глазах у Господа, поэтому должен соблюдать личное благочестие. Именно мама прививала детям основы вероисповедания, знакомила их с красотой окружающего мира. Проповеди в церкви и занятия, на которых изучали Библию, Анна Регина посещала вместе с детьми. Достаточно часто в доме Кантов можно было встретить доктора теологии Франца Шульца, который и заметил незаурядные способности Иммануила в изучении Библии, а еще умение выражать и отстаивать собственные суждения. Мальчику исполнилось 8, когда мама привела его в самую лучшую школу Кенигсберга. Это была гимназия им.
Фридриха, и ее рекомендовал в качестве учебного заведения именно Шульц. Он сел за школьную парту в 1732 году и провел там восемь лет. Уроки начинались в семь часов и продолжались до девяти. Главными предметами были Ветхий и Новый заветы, теология, география, латынь, греческий и немецкий языки. Изучение философии начиналось в старшей школе, и Иммануил всегда говорил, что этот предмет изучали неправильно. Заниматься математикой можно было только за деньги, к тому же, если у ученика имелось желание.
Родители уже видели сына в сане священника, но мальчик с большим интересом изучал латынь и мечтал в будущем стать преподавателем словесности. К тому же, ученикам религиозной школы приходилось подчиняться строгим правилам и нравам этого заведения, а Канту это очень не нравилось. Иммануил никогда не отличался крепким здоровьем, однако показывал отличные успехи в учебе, все благодаря природной сообразительности и недюжинным умственным способностям. В возрасте тринадцати лет мальчик потерял маму. Она долго болела и так и не смогла оправиться. Семья влачила жалкое существование, Кант зачастую нуждался в самом элементарном.
Он практически голодал, и не отказывался от помощи более богатых однокурсников. Случалось так, что ему нечего было обуть, тогда он одалживал ботинки у друзей, и шел на лекции.
В чем причины русского «антикантианства»?
Почему история философии делится на «до» и «после» Канта? И как учения философа помогут современному человеку бороться с фейками и информационными атаками?
«Мы в центре мощнейшей когнитивной войны»: Алиханов объяснил, почему нужна ревизия учения Канта
But a geographer will see it as a sign of an old grudge. His judgment is imperative and categorical. Depending on the mood, the affirmation, a priori and without concept, can make a philosopher smile or choke up.
One of the recommended strategies by two of these researchers Jonathan Haidt and Jean M. Twenge is to ban cellphones in class, which would improve the quality of relationships between people.
Kant would undoubtedly add that this would also facilitate learning and would say how. Kant and the educational benefits of immobility Kant is such an important name in so many areas of philosophy that one might forget that he was also interested in education. One of his ideas concerns the importance of keeping still for children. Let us translate: through this window created by immobility and listening, and by the attention it allows, ideas can come to their senses.
This idea obviously raises important questions and debates about the nature and role of authority in education. This is because the means discipline here seem to contradict the intended end freedom and autonomy. But let us leave these questions aside and transpose what Kant said in the XVIIIe century in our time and to the infinite and so irresistible stimuli that cellphones and social networks constantly provoke. One can easily see in this an immense danger for the very practice of transmitting and understanding ideas and knowledge, and for the formation of work habits.
Its highest principle is the moral law, from which we derive duties that command how we ought to act in specific situations. Kant also claims that reflection on our moral duties and our need for happiness leads to the thought of an ideal world, which he calls the highest good see section 6. Given how the world is theoretical philosophy and how it ought to be practical philosophy , we aim to make the world better by constructing or realizing the highest good. In theoretical philosophy, we use our categories and forms of intuition to construct a world of experience or nature.
In practical philosophy, we use the moral law to construct the idea of a moral world or a realm of ends that guides our conduct 4:433 , and ultimately to transform the natural world into the highest good. Theoretical philosophy deals with appearances, to which our knowledge is strictly limited; and practical philosophy deals with things in themselves, although it does not give us knowledge about things in themselves but only provides rational justification for certain beliefs about them for practical purposes. The three traditional topics of Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics were rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology, which dealt, respectively, with the human soul, the world-whole, and God. In the part of the Critique of Pure Reason called the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant argues against the Leibniz-Wolffian view that human beings are capable of a priori knowledge in each of these domains, and he claims that the errors of Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics are due to an illusion that has its seat in the nature of human reason itself.
According to Kant, human reason necessarily produces ideas of the soul, the world-whole, and God; and these ideas unavoidably produce the illusion that we have a priori knowledge about transcendent objects corresponding to them. This is an illusion, however, because in fact we are not capable of a priori knowledge about any such transcendent objects. Nevertheless, Kant attempts to show that these illusory ideas have a positive, practical use. He thus reframes Leibniz-Wolffian special metaphysics as a practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals.
If this was not within his control at the time, then, while it may be useful to punish him in order to shape his behavior or to influence others, it nevertheless would not be correct to say that his action was morally wrong. Moral rightness and wrongness apply only to free agents who control their actions and have it in their power, at the time of their actions, either to act rightly or not. According to Kant, this is just common sense. On the compatibilist view, as Kant understands it, I am free whenever the cause of my action is within me.
If we distinguish between involuntary convulsions and voluntary bodily movements, then on this view free actions are just voluntary bodily movements. The proximate causes of these movements are internal to the turnspit, the projectile, and the clock at the time of the movement. This cannot be sufficient for moral responsibility. Why not?
The reason, Kant says, is ultimately that the causes of these movements occur in time. Return to the theft example. The thief decided to commit the theft, and his action flowed from this decision. If that cause too was an event occurring in time, then it must also have a cause beginning in a still earlier time, etc.
All natural events occur in time and are thoroughly determined by causal chains that stretch backwards into the distant past. So there is no room for freedom in nature, which is deterministic in a strong sense. The root of the problem, for Kant, is time. But the past is out of his control now, in the present.
Even if he could control those past events in the past, he cannot control them now. But in fact past events were not in his control in the past either if they too were determined by events in the more distant past, because eventually the causal antecedents of his action stretch back before his birth, and obviously events that occurred before his birth were never in his control. In that case, it would be a mistake to hold him morally responsible for it. Compatibilism, as Kant understands it, therefore locates the issue in the wrong place.
Even if the cause of my action is internal to me, if it is in the past — for example, if my action today is determined by a decision I made yesterday, or from the character I developed in childhood — then it is not within my control now. The real issue is not whether the cause of my action is internal or external to me, but whether it is in my control now. For Kant, however, the cause of my action can be within my control now only if it is not in time. This is why Kant thinks that transcendental idealism is the only way to make sense of the kind of freedom that morality requires.
Transcendental idealism allows that the cause of my action may be a thing in itself outside of time: namely, my noumenal self, which is free because it is not part of nature. My noumenal self is an uncaused cause outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with which our understanding constructs experience. Many puzzles arise on this picture that Kant does not resolve. For example, if my understanding constructs all appearances in my experience of nature, not only appearances of my own actions, then why am I responsible only for my own actions but not for everything that happens in the natural world?
Moreover, if I am not alone in the world but there are many noumenal selves acting freely and incorporating their free actions into the experience they construct, then how do multiple transcendentally free agents interact? How do you integrate my free actions into the experience that your understanding constructs? Finally, since Kant invokes transcendental idealism to make sense of freedom, interpreting his thinking about freedom leads us back to disputes between the two-objects and two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism. But applying the two-objects interpretation to freedom raises problems of its own, since it involves making a distinction between noumenal and phenomenal selves that does not arise on the two-aspects view.
If only my noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, then my phenomenal self is not morally responsible. But how are my noumenal and phenomenal selves related, and why is punishment inflicted on phenomenal selves? We do not have theoretical knowledge that we are free or about anything beyond the limits of possible experience, but we are morally justified in believing that we are free in this sense. On the other hand, Kant also uses stronger language than this when discussing freedom.
Our practical knowledge of freedom is based instead on the moral law. So, on his view, the fact of reason is the practical basis for our belief or practical knowledge that we are free. Every human being has a conscience, a common sense grasp of morality, and a firm conviction that he or she is morally accountable. We may arrive at different conclusions about what morality requires in specific situations.
And we may violate our own sense of duty. But we all have a conscience, and an unshakeable belief that morality applies to us. It is just a ground-level fact about human beings that we hold ourselves morally accountable. But Kant is making a normative claim here as well: it is also a fact, which cannot and does not need to be justified, that we are morally accountable, that morality does have authority over us.
Kant holds that philosophy should be in the business of defending this common sense moral belief, and that in any case we could never prove or disprove it 4:459. Kant may hold that the fact of reason, or our consciousness of moral obligation, implies that we are free on the grounds that ought implies can. In other words, Kant may believe that it follows from the fact that we ought morally to do something that we can or are able to do it. This is a hypothetical example of an action not yet carried out.
On this view, to act morally is to exercise freedom, and the only way to fully exercise freedom is to act morally. First, it follows from the basic idea of having a will that to act at all is to act on some principle, or what Kant calls a maxim. A maxim is a subjective rule or policy of action: it says what you are doing and why. We may be unaware of our maxims, we may not act consistently on the same maxims, and our maxims may not be consistent with one another.
But Kant holds that since we are rational beings our actions always aim at some sort of end or goal, which our maxim expresses. The goal of an action may be something as basic as gratifying a desire, or it may be something more complex such as becoming a doctor or a lawyer. If I act to gratify some desire, then I choose to act on a maxim that specifies the gratification of that desire as the goal of my action. For example, if I desire some coffee, then I may act on the maxim to go to a cafe and buy some coffee in order to gratify that desire.
Second, Kant distinguishes between two basic kinds of principles or rules that we can act on: what he calls material and formal principles. To act in order to satisfy some desire, as when I act on the maxim to go for coffee at a cafe, is to act on a material principle 5:21ff. Here the desire for coffee fixes the goal, which Kant calls the object or matter of the action, and the principle says how to achieve that goal go to a cafe. A hypothetical imperative is a principle of rationality that says I should act in a certain way if I choose to satisfy some desire.
If maxims in general are rules that describe how one does act, then imperatives in general prescribe how one should act. An imperative is hypothetical if it says how I should act only if I choose to pursue some goal in order to gratify a desire 5:20. This, for example, is a hypothetical imperative: if you want coffee, then go to the cafe. This hypothetical imperative applies to you only if you desire coffee and choose to gratify that desire.
In contrast to material principles, formal principles describe how one acts without making reference to any desires. This is easiest to understand through the corresponding kind of imperative, which Kant calls a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative commands unconditionally that I should act in some way. So while hypothetical imperatives apply to me only on the condition that I have and set the goal of satisfying the desires that they tell me how to satisfy, categorical imperatives apply to me no matter what my goals and desires may be.
Kant regards moral laws as categorical imperatives, which apply to everyone unconditionally. For example, the moral requirement to help others in need does not apply to me only if I desire to help others in need, and the duty not to steal is not suspended if I have some desire that I could satisfy by stealing. Moral laws do not have such conditions but rather apply unconditionally. That is why they apply to everyone in the same way.
Third, insofar as I act only on material principles or hypothetical imperatives, I do not act freely, but rather I act only to satisfy some desire s that I have, and what I desire is not ultimately within my control. To some limited extent we are capable of rationally shaping our desires, but insofar as we choose to act in order to satisfy desires we are choosing to let nature govern us rather than governing ourselves 5:118. We are always free in the sense that we always have the capacity to govern ourselves rationally instead of letting our desires set our ends for us. But we may freely fail to exercise that capacity.
Moreover, since Kant holds that desires never cause us to act, but rather we always choose to act on a maxim even when that maxim specifies the satisfaction of a desire as the goal of our action, it also follows that we are always free in the sense that we freely choose our maxims. Nevertheless, our actions are not free in the sense of being autonomous if we choose to act only on material principles, because in that case we do not give the law to ourselves, but instead we choose to allow nature in us our desires to determine the law for our actions. Finally, the only way to act freely in the full sense of exercising autonomy is therefore to act on formal principles or categorical imperatives, which is also to act morally. Kant does not mean that acting autonomously requires that we take no account of our desires, which would be impossible 5:25, 61.
This immediate consciousness of the moral law takes the following form: I have, for example, made it my maxim to increase my wealth by every safe means. Now I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which has died and left no record of it. This is, naturally, a case for my maxim. Now I want only to know whether that maxim could also hold as a universal practical law.
Moreover, the Russian Federation now has plenty of German trophies. Recently, a slightly damaged Leopard 2A5 tank was removed from the battlefield. It is strange that Mr. Scholz has not yet prohibited the Russian military from dismantling it.
Advance: концепция Макрона о воинственной и сильной Европе ошибочна
Иммануил Кант – самый русский из европейских и самый европейский из русских философов. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге – сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет даже. [–] Emmanuel__Kant 2 points3 points4 points 1 year ago (0 children). I have allways the high cost champion. В рамках международного Кантовского конгресса в Калининграде инициаторы развития «Балтийской платформы» – ИМЭМО РАН, МГИМО МИД России, БФУ имени И. Канта при. Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников.
Главное правило жизни, которому учит философия Канта
18+. Вы здесь. Главная» Эммануэль Макрон. Immanuel Kant e il nazismo | ». Полузащитник «Челси» Н'Голо Канте завершил медицинское обследование перед подписанием контракта с клубом «Аль-Иттихад» из Саудовской Аравии. Канте прошёл вторую часть.
Иммануил Кант: философ, присягнувший на верность Российской империи
Kant had a burst of publishing activity in the years after he returned from working as a private tutor. In 1754 and 1755 he published three scientific works — one of which, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens 1755 , was a major book in which, among other things, he developed what later became known as the nebular hypothesis about the formation of the solar system. Unfortunately, the printer went bankrupt and the book had little immediate impact. To secure qualifications for teaching at the university, Kant also wrote two Latin dissertations: the first, entitled Concise Outline of Some Reflections on Fire 1755 , earned him the Magister degree; and the second, New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition 1755 , entitled him to teach as an unsalaried lecturer. The following year he published another Latin work, The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, of Which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology 1756 , in hopes of succeeding Knutzen as associate professor of logic and metaphysics, though Kant failed to secure this position. Both works depart from Leibniz-Wolffian views, though not radically. Kant held this position from 1755 to 1770, during which period he would lecture an average of twenty hours per week on logic, metaphysics, and ethics, as well as mathematics, physics, and physical geography. In his lectures Kant used textbooks by Wolffian authors such as Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten 1714—1762 and Georg Friedrich Meier 1718—1777 , but he followed them loosely and used them to structure his own reflections, which drew on a wide range of ideas of contemporary interest. These ideas often stemmed from British sentimentalist philosophers such as David Hume 1711—1776 and Francis Hutcheson 1694—1747 , some of whose texts were translated into German in the mid-1750s; and from the Swiss philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1712—1778 , who published a flurry of works in the early 1760s. From early in his career Kant was a popular and successful lecturer.
After several years of relative quiet, Kant unleashed another burst of publications in 1762—1764, including five philosophical works. The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures 1762 rehearses criticisms of Aristotelian logic that were developed by other German philosophers. The book attracted several positive and some negative reviews. In Negative Magnitudes Kant also argues that the morality of an action is a function of the internal forces that motivate one to act, rather than of the external physical actions or their consequences. Finally, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime 1764 deals mainly with alleged differences in the tastes of men and women and of people from different cultures. After it was published, Kant filled his own interleaved copy of this book with often unrelated handwritten remarks, many of which reflect the deep influence of Rousseau on his thinking about moral philosophy in the mid-1760s. These works helped to secure Kant a broader reputation in Germany, but for the most part they were not strikingly original. While some of his early works tend to emphasize rationalist ideas, others have a more empiricist emphasis. During this time Kant was striving to work out an independent position, but before the 1770s his views remained fluid.
In 1766 Kant published his first work concerned with the possibility of metaphysics, which later became a central topic of his mature philosophy. In 1770, at the age of forty-six, Kant was appointed to the chair in logic and metaphysics at the Albertina, after teaching for fifteen years as an unsalaried lecturer and working since 1766 as a sublibrarian to supplement his income. Kant was turned down for the same position in 1758. In order to inaugurate his new position, Kant also wrote one more Latin dissertation: Concerning the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World 1770 , which is known as the Inaugural Dissertation. Inspired by Crusius and the Swiss natural philosopher Johann Heinrich Lambert 1728—1777 , Kant distinguishes between two fundamental powers of cognition, sensibility and understanding intelligence , where the Leibniz-Wolffians regarded understanding intellect as the only fundamental power. Moreover, as the title of the Inaugural Dissertation indicates, Kant argues that sensibility and understanding are directed at two different worlds: sensibility gives us access to the sensible world, while understanding enables us to grasp a distinct intelligible world. The Inaugural Dissertation thus develops a form of Platonism; and it rejects the view of British sentimentalists that moral judgments are based on feelings of pleasure or pain, since Kant now holds that moral judgments are based on pure understanding alone. After 1770 Kant never surrendered the views that sensibility and understanding are distinct powers of cognition, that space and time are subjective forms of human sensibility, and that moral judgments are based on pure understanding or reason alone. But his embrace of Platonism in the Inaugural Dissertation was short-lived.
He soon denied that our understanding is capable of insight into an intelligible world, which cleared the path toward his mature position in the Critique of Pure Reason 1781 , according to which the understanding like sensibility supplies forms that structure our experience of the sensible world, to which human knowledge is limited, while the intelligible or noumenal world is strictly unknowable to us. Kant spent a decade working on the Critique of Pure Reason and published nothing else of significance between 1770 and 1781. Kant also published a number of important essays in this period, including Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Aim 1784 and Conjectural Beginning of Human History 1786 , his main contributions to the philosophy of history; An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? Jacobi 1743—1819 accused the recently deceased G. Lessing 1729—1781 of Spinozism. With these works Kant secured international fame and came to dominate German philosophy in the late 1780s. But in 1790 he announced that the Critique of the Power of Judgment brought his critical enterprise to an end 5:170. By then K. In 1794 his chair at Jena passed to J.
Kant retired from teaching in 1796. For nearly two decades he had lived a highly disciplined life focused primarily on completing his philosophical system, which began to take definite shape in his mind only in middle age. After retiring he came to believe that there was a gap in this system separating the metaphysical foundations of natural science from physics itself, and he set out to close this gap in a series of notes that postulate the existence of an ether or caloric matter. Kant died February 12, 1804, just short of his eightieth birthday. See also Bxiv; and 4:255—257. Thus metaphysics for Kant concerns a priori knowledge, or knowledge whose justification does not depend on experience; and he associates a priori knowledge with reason. The project of the Critique is to examine whether, how, and to what extent human reason is capable of a priori knowledge. The Enlightenment was a reaction to the rise and successes of modern science in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The spectacular achievements of Newton in particular engendered widespread confidence and optimism about the power of human reason to control nature and to improve human life.
One effect of this new confidence in reason was that traditional authorities were increasingly questioned. Why should we need political or religious authorities to tell us how to live or what to believe, if each of us has the capacity to figure these things out for ourselves? Kant expresses this Enlightenment commitment to the sovereignty of reason in the Critique: Our age is the age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion through its holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination. Axi Enlightenment is about thinking for oneself rather than letting others think for you, according to What is Enlightenment? In this essay, Kant also expresses the Enlightenment faith in the inevitability of progress. A few independent thinkers will gradually inspire a broader cultural movement, which ultimately will lead to greater freedom of action and governmental reform. The problem is that to some it seemed unclear whether progress would in fact ensue if reason enjoyed full sovereignty over traditional authorities; or whether unaided reasoning would instead lead straight to materialism, fatalism, atheism, skepticism Bxxxiv , or even libertinism and authoritarianism 8:146.
The Enlightenment commitment to the sovereignty of reason was tied to the expectation that it would not lead to any of these consequences but instead would support certain key beliefs that tradition had always sanctioned. Crucially, these included belief in God, the soul, freedom, and the compatibility of science with morality and religion. Although a few intellectuals rejected some or all of these beliefs, the general spirit of the Enlightenment was not so radical. The Enlightenment was about replacing traditional authorities with the authority of individual human reason, but it was not about overturning traditional moral and religious beliefs. Yet the original inspiration for the Enlightenment was the new physics, which was mechanistic. If nature is entirely governed by mechanistic, causal laws, then it may seem that there is no room for freedom, a soul, or anything but matter in motion. This threatened the traditional view that morality requires freedom. We must be free in order to choose what is right over what is wrong, because otherwise we cannot be held responsible. It also threatened the traditional religious belief in a soul that can survive death or be resurrected in an afterlife.
So modern science, the pride of the Enlightenment, the source of its optimism about the powers of human reason, threatened to undermine traditional moral and religious beliefs that free rational thought was expected to support. This was the main intellectual crisis of the Enlightenment. In other words, free rational inquiry adequately supports all of these essential human interests and shows them to be mutually consistent. So reason deserves the sovereignty attributed to it by the Enlightenment. The Inaugural Dissertation also tries to reconcile Newtonian science with traditional morality and religion in a way, but its strategy is different from that of the Critique. According to the Inaugural Dissertation, Newtonian science is true of the sensible world, to which sensibility gives us access; and the understanding grasps principles of divine and moral perfection in a distinct intelligible world, which are paradigms for measuring everything in the sensible world. So on this view our knowledge of the intelligible world is a priori because it does not depend on sensibility, and this a priori knowledge furnishes principles for judging the sensible world because in some way the sensible world itself conforms to or imitates the intelligible world. Soon after writing the Inaugural Dissertation, however, Kant expressed doubts about this view. As he explained in a February 21, 1772 letter to his friend and former student, Marcus Herz: In my dissertation I was content to explain the nature of intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of the soul brought about by the object.
However, I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible…. And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects — objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby? The position of the Inaugural Dissertation is that the intelligible world is independent of the human understanding and of the sensible world, both of which in different ways conform to the intelligible world. But, leaving aside questions about what it means for the sensible world to conform to an intelligible world, how is it possible for the human understanding to conform to or grasp an intelligible world? If the intelligible world is independent of our understanding, then it seems that we could grasp it only if we are passively affected by it in some way. So the only way we could grasp an intelligible world that is independent of us is through sensibility, which means that our knowledge of it could not be a priori. The pure understanding alone could at best enable us to form representations of an intelligible world. Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world.
But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects.
If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object as an object of the senses conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized as given objects conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. Bxvi—xviii As this passage suggests, what Kant has changed in the Critique is primarily his view about the role and powers of the understanding, since he already held in the Inaugural Dissertation that sensibility contributes the forms of space and time — which he calls pure or a priori intuitions 2:397 — to our cognition of the sensible world. But the Critique claims that pure understanding too, rather than giving us insight into an intelligible world, is limited to providing forms — which he calls pure or a priori concepts — that structure our cognition of the sensible world. So now both sensibility and understanding work together to construct cognition of the sensible world, which therefore conforms to the a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties: the a priori intuitions of sensibility and the a priori concepts of the understanding.
Действующее соглашение Канте с «Челси» истекает в июле текущего года. Руководство синих до сих пор сомневается, стоит ли продлевать сотрудничество с возрастным игроком. По информации источника, «Арсенал» предложил Канте двухлетний контракт с опцией продления ещё на один сезон.
В музее известного философа с помощью искусственного интеллекта создали виртуального собеседника. Пока задать вопрос можно только на интересные ему темы. Но разработчики обещают расширить «кругозор» мыслителя. С анимированным портретом 44-летнего Канта кисти Иоганна Готлиба Беккера теперь старается пообщаться почти каждый экскурсант Кафедрального собора. В беседе с вируальным Кантом надо соблюдать определенный этикет, точнее правила работы с системой. Во-первых , он не терпит фамильярности.
BFU professor Artyom Yurok said depending on which theory was true, it could lead to the end of the universe. Neither stars nor even galaxies would survive a disaster like this. If the second hypothesis is correct and dark energy is really a quintessence, then the future may hold a lot of amazing and unpleasant surprises.